vuln-fix: Partial Path Traversal Vulnerability

This fixes a partial path traversal vulnerability.

Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.

To demonstrate this vulnerability, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.

Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: Medium
CVSSS: 6.1
Detection: CodeQL & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.PartialPathTraversalVulnerability)

Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>

Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#13

Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>

src/main/java/com/epam/jira/util/JiraInfoProvider.java

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ public static void saveFile(File file) {
         // Get relative file path if file placed in target directory or copy it there
         try {
             String filePath = file.getCanonicalPath();
-            boolean placedOutOfTargetDir = !filePath.startsWith(currentDir + FileUtils.getTargetDir());
+            boolean placedOutOfTargetDir = !file.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(currentDir + FileUtils.getTargetDir());
             targetFilePath = placedOutOfTargetDir
                     ? FileUtils.saveFile(file, file.getName())
                     : filePath.replaceFirst(currentDir, "");