frontend: Fixing protobufjs Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Pollution #3014
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…ect Prototype Pollution
A user-controlled protobuf message can be used by an attacker to pollute the prototype of Object.prototype by adding and overwriting its data and functions. Exploitation can involve: (1) using the function parse to parse protobuf messages on the fly, (2) loading .proto files by using load/loadSync functions, or (3) providing untrusted input to the functions ReflectionObject.setParsedOption and util.setProperty.
## Vulnerability Description
* Using the parse function
```js
const protobuf = require("protobufjs");
protobuf.parse('option(a).constructor.prototype.verified = true;');
console.log({}.verified);
// returns true
```
* Using the `setParsedOption` function of a `ReflectionObject`
```js
const protobuf = require("protobufjs");
function gadgetFunction(){
console.log("User is authenticated");
}
// This will fail, but also pollute the prototype of Object
try {
let obj = new protobuf.ReflectionObject("Test");
obj.setParsedOption("unimportant!", gadgetFunction, "constructor.prototype.testFn");
} catch (e) {}
// Now we can make use of the new function on the polluted prototype
const a = {};
a.testFn();
// Prints "User is authenticated" to the console.
```
* Using the function `util.setProperty`
```js
const protobuf = require("protobufjs");
protobuf.util.setProperty({}, "constructor.prototype.verified", true);
console.log({}.verified);
// returns true
```
* With the `proto.poc` file containing the following line:
```
option(foo).constructor.prototype.verified = true;
```
CWE-1321
`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`
|
Hey thanks for the fix! Lets also update clutch/frontend/api/package.json Line 13 in b42e681 edit: Also the proto tooling clutch/tools/compile-protos.sh Line 17 in b42e681 |
|
This PR has been marked as stale after 7 or more days of inactivity. Please have a maintainer add the |
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A user-controlled protobuf message can be used by an attacker to pollute the prototype of Object.prototype by adding and overwriting its data and functions. Exploitation can involve: (1) using the function parse to parse protobuf messages on the fly, (2) loading .proto files by using load/loadSync functions, or (3) providing untrusted input to the functions ReflectionObject.setParsedOption and util.setProperty.
GitHub Issue
#3013