From 201e67bbea8b9d63cfc522ae4cef5099d3c1b4a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Miller Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 17:53:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] readme --- README.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 8eca09e..d52fd37 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ in 2008. ChaCha aims to increase the diffusion per round, but had slightly less cryptanalysis. It was standardized in [RFC 8439](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439) and is now used in TLS 1.3. -XChaCha20 ([draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha)) +[XChaCha20](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha) extended-nonce variant is also provided. Similar to XSalsa, it's safe to use with randomly-generated nonces. @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ algorithms, key rotation is advised. hkdf would work great for this case. A "protected message" would mean a probability of `2**-50` that a passive attacker successfully distinguishes the ciphertext outputs of the AEAD scheme from the outputs -of a random function. See [RFC draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits/) for details. +of a random function. See [draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits/) for details. - Max message size: - AES-GCM: ~68GB, `2**36-256`