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supreme_org_val.txt
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supreme_org_val.txt
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The role of the CPSU in the former Soviet Union was defined in Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR (1977) and in Article 6 of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR (1978), which were worded along identical lines. Those provisions stated:
The applicant was arrested and detained between 4 February 1997 and 2 April 1997. On 6 March 1997 the provisional indictment was served on him.
On 25 June 1993 the applicant was charged with manslaughter. It appears that the applicant had by then left the country and was not notified of the decision.
On 20 June 2000 the Industrialnyy District Court of Barnaul found, upon the applicant's complaint, that the search had been unlawful. The judgment was not appealed against and acquired legal force ten days later. On 8 May 2001 the Presidium of the Altay Regional Court rejected the Prosecutor's application for supervisory review and upheld the judgment of 20 June 2000.
On 19 December 1986 the judge gave permission for a lawyer to be instructed to act in proceedings brought by P.C. contesting the bankrupt estate's liabilities.
On 12 February 1999 and 17 September 1999, the Commercial Court and the High Commercial Court in Belgrade (Viši privredni sud u Beogradu), respectively, rejected the debtors' requests for a stay of the enforcement proceedings.
The public prosecutor may also apply at any time for the accused to be released. The investigating judge shall rule within five days of such an application.”
The applicant was given an opportunity to conclude his claim in writing and by decision of 28 January 1999 the Administrative Court of Appeal refused the applicant’s request for leave to appeal.
In 1992 the Federal Constitutional Court established that the denial of the existence of gas chambers was an allegation of facts which had been proven untrue and that this allegation can be prohibited on account of their offending nature. In 1996 the Bavarian Court of Appeal confirmed that the denial of the existence of gas chambers was punishable under Section 189 of the Criminal Code.
“Where the damage results from administrative deeds or acts ... the right to make a claim shall lapse one year after the event giving rise to the claim for compensation.”
On 8 March 1995 the Fethiye Assize Court amended the procedural errors in its former judgment and handed down the same sentence against the applicant. The applicant appealed.
The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition of detention on remand (aresztowanie tymczasowe), the grounds for its prolongation, release from detention and rules governing other, so-called “preventive measures” (środki zapobiegawcze) are stated in the Court's judgments in the cases of Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02, §§ 27-33, 25 April 2006 and Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006.
Pursuant to section 39 of the Law, soberingup centres are to be set up and managed by the authorities of municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. Section 40 of the Law, as applicable at the relevant time, provided, in so far as relevant:
As there was again no reply, on 25 October 1999 the applicant's lawyer sent another letter to the public prosecutor, requesting information about any action undertaken concerning the applicant's case. He made no reference to the civil proceedings that had already finished and did not inform the public prosecutor of the identity of the police officers concerned, which had been determined in the course of the civil proceedings.
On an unspecified date in 1992, the applicants allegedly sought the enforcement of this judgment before the Ankara 6th Enforcement Office. They have not, however, submitted any supporting documents regarding these enforcement proceedings, which they blamed on the destruction of the archives of the enforcement office.
Eleven hearings were adjourned because of various problems attributable to the authorities, such as the failure to properly summon or serve documents on defendants, or to obtain expert reports in time.
On 23 September 2004 the Pavlograd City Court rejected the applicant's complaint against the Bailiffs. The court indicated, inter alia, that the award could not be paid due to the debtor's lack of funds. The scope of action for the Bailiffs was also limited by the funds allocated from the State Budget to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy for payment of the industrial benefits.
If despite any evidence relied upon to explain his silence or in the absence of any such evidence, the jury conclude the silence can only sensibly be attributed to the defendant's having no answer or none that would stand up to cross-examination, they may draw an adverse inference.”
On the Saturday morning before being escorted back to Broadmoor, X had instructed solicitors to apply for a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf.
The witnesses stated that the plot had been used by the ancestor of the defendants prior to the Gulf War and that during the Gulf War the military command had moved the fence and had taken actual possession of half the plot.
A subsequent article by the second applicant, dated 16 January 1993 and entitled “The Attorney-General and the clowns [μασκαράδες]”, stated that the Minister of Defence, Mr Aloneftis, through an article in another Cypriot newspaper, had had the “incredible nerve” to request Alithia to name the suppliers of armament systems who were paying commissions to State officials. The article read as follows:
The applicant was one of the six founding partners and a holder of 24% of the shares of a limited liability company (“the company”) set up on 12 June 1996 to run a retail shop. The shop, privatised by those partners in 1994 and valued at some 50,100 Georgian laris (GEL) (approximately 22,000 euros (EUR)), was designated as the company’s founding capital.
An explanatory note attached to the back of the scan image referred to the haemorrhage as “chronic”, in other words resulting from bleeding over a prolonged period.
The applicant, Ms Josefin Hallgren, is a Swedish national, who was born in 1974 and lives in Enskede, Sweden. She is represented before the Court by Mrs R. Harrold-Claesson, a lawyer practising in Olofstorp, Sweden.
The above requirement may be fulfilled in the manner specified by the Commission in its decision ordering the prohibited aid to be abolished. If the requirement is not met, the aid in question will once more become unlawful.
The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm. Again, he did not request an oral hearing. On 14 February 1997 his appeals were rejected.
The convening officer usually acted as confirming officer also. A court-martial’s findings were not effective until confirmed by the confirming officer, who was empowered to withhold confirmation or substitute, postpone or remit in whole or in part any sentence.
By an order of 2 August 1999, the division of the Palermo District Court responsible for reviewing precautionary measures (“the Specialised Division”), finding that the preliminary investigations judge had not correctly assessed the evidence of the applicant’s guilt, set aside the order of 12 July 1999 and ordered the applicant’s release.
On 14 November 1986 the property-management company Régie Naef SA ("Naef"), which managed the building in which the flat in issue was located, informed the applicant that renovation and building work was going to be carried out on the block.
As far as the protection of written communications between lawyer and client is concerned, it is apparent from the legal systems of the Member States that, although the principle of such protection is generally recognised, its scope and the criteria for applying it vary ...
The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court. On 9 February 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s petition. This decision was served on him on 25 April 2005.
“The USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB – hereinafter ‘the SSC’) is recognised as a criminal organisation which was responsible for war crimes, genocide, repression, terror and political persecution in the territory of Lithuania when occupied by the USSR.”
One of the principal aims of the applicant association is the protection of human rights. The second applicant is a lawyer. His practice includes acting as counsel in civil and criminal cases in the courts in Plovdiv and representing applicants in proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights.
“It shall be an offence punishable by imprisonment or a fine following a complaint to use a camera to observe, or image-recording equipment to record, any matter pertaining to a person’s personal life or, if it would not be in public view but for the camera or equipment, to his or her private life, without the consent of the person concerned.”
On 29 and 30 September 2003 the applicant company lodged documents with ANRTI indicating its new address, together with a request to modify its licences accordingly, and paid the licence fee.
In December 2004 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Voroshylovskyy District Court of the Donetsk Region against the Bailiffs' Service for the non-enforcement of the judgment in his favour. On 5 April 2005 the court found for the applicant and ordered the Bailiffs' Service to enforce the judgment in question.
On 9 August 2006 a deputy Prosecutor General lodged an application for supervisory review with the Presidium of the Krasnodar Regional Court. He submitted that the Krasnodar Regional Court had infringed the applicant’s right to attend the appeal hearing.
In July 2001 the applicant appealed against the order, arguing that the Regional Court had failed to issue a reasoned decision concerning the extension of her detention. Three of the applicant’s co-defendants also appealed and sought leave to appear at the appeal hearing. The applicant did not file such a request.
By an additional judgment dated 4 May 2004, the Ankara State Security Court, taking into account the amendment to the definition of “terror acts” under section 7 of Law no. 3713 pursuant to Law no. 4928, acquitted the applicant, who had not taken part in any violent activities, and nullified his conviction, together with all its consequences. This judgment became final on 11 May 2004.
On 24 March 2004 the Edineţ District Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant to pay him 97,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 6,284 euros (EUR) at the time). The judgment was not appealed against and after fifteen days it became final and enforceable.
As to Article 10 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court observed that its application in respect of recording court hearings had not yet been tested. The lacking Convention standard had therefore to be substituted by a domestic standard. The Constitutional Court was of the view that there was accordingly a violation of Article 10 of the Convention as well.
Section 72 provides that an administrative decision taken on the merits of a case may be challenged in court within thirty days from its delivery. Such judicial review may, however, take place only if the administrative remedies - if any - available in the case have already been exhausted.
The applicant, Mr Ousman Mbengeh, is a Gambian national who was born in 1971 and lived, at the time of lodging his application with the Court, in Helsinki. He is represented before the Court by Ms K. Heimonen, a lawyer practising in Espoo.
In the 1980’s construction work was started in order to build a road to the Island of Onkisalo, which has no connection to the mainland. The part of the road (the Kattilaniemi road) which is situated on the mainland, and in the construction of which the applicants also participated, was finished at the end of the 1980’s.
In April 1997 the applicant requested the Government to exercise its power under Chapter 7, Section 16 of the Aliens Act to annul the expulsion order. By a decision of 5 June 1997 the Government rejected the request.
“If the Supreme Court considers that a complaint does not provide grounds for overturning the judgment appealed against and does not require answers to questions of law in the interests of the unity or development of the law, it may, in giving reasons for its decision on the matter, limit itself to that finding.”
The applicant is a Greek national, born in 1949 and living in Varkiza in Attika. She is represented before the Court by Mr M. Angelopoulos, a lawyer practising in Athens.
The first piece of legislation on dress in higher-education institutions was a set of regulations that was issued by the Cabinet on 22 July 1981, which required staff working for public organisations and institutions and personnel and students at State institutions to wear ordinary, sober, modern dress. The regulations also provided that female members of staff and students should not wear veils in educational institutions.
On 12 December 1994 a hearing was held in the case. The applicant limited the amount claimed to AS 24,339.80 and submitted further documentation. The court adjourned the hearing for the files in all parallel proceedings to be obtained.
On 30 September 2003 the Cologne Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) rejected the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible on the ground that the applicant had failed to submit the grounds for his appeal within the statutory time-limit of one month. This decision was served on the applicant on 8 October 2003.
(b) The term of the members of the Presidency elected in the first election shall be two years; the term of members subsequently elected shall be four years. Members shall be eligible to succeed themselves once and shall thereafter be ineligible for four years.
On 30 June 1997 the applicant lodged a request for restitution of the confiscated property with an administrative body, which has not yet issued a decision.
The applicants are two retired social workers. They both worked for the City of Helsinki for a period of 35 years until their retirement in 1990 when they were granted an employment pension but no national pension’s basic amount as they had not yet reached the required age. Their employment pensions amounted to 66 per cent of their salaries.
On 15 February 2001 M.C. appealed to the Naples Court of Appeal. The proceedings were still pending on 13 February 2004.
On 11 August 2005 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant’s claim against the Łódź Municipality. The applicant appealed.
According to section 1 of the Unemployment Funds Act (työttömyyskassalaki, lag om arbetslöshetskassor; 1984/603), the purpose of an unemployment fund is, inter alia, to provide its members unemployment benefits pursuant to the Act on Unemployment Benefits. Section 2 provides that the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health grants licences to establish an unemployment fund.
On 24 October 1995 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody. As grounds for her detention the investigator cited the seriousness of the offence charged against her.
The indictment of 24 May 1999 has been amended on two occasions, and two further indictments have been brought. The applicant has consistently refused to plead, and pleas of not guilty have been entered on his behalf.
The Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court of the USSR “On judicial practice regarding the offence of smuggling” (no. 2 of 3 February 1978) provided as follows:
“Complains about depression, weakness, insomnia, irritability. No acute psychiatric symptoms are observed. Depressed. The next visit is scheduled for 25 June 1997.”
Pursuant to subsection 2, each parent is obliged to refrain from any actions which could disturb the relationship of the other parent with the child.
According to the Commission, the length of time for which Matznetter was detained while on remand could not be justified by facts which occurred later: the only facts to be taken into account were those existing at the time, excluding his conviction on 6 February 1967.
In October 1999 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Zarichny District Court of Sumy (the “Zarichny Court”) against the Department of Education of the Sumy Municipal Council (Department), seeking the recovery of unpaid salary.
In addition, they lodged a criminal complaint, with an application to join the proceedings as civil parties, alleging forgery in connection with the decision of 30 November 1995 and asked the administrative court to defer its decision until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.
The applicant is a Finnish national living in Oulunsalo. She is represented before the Court by Mr Mikko Hunnakko, a lawyer in Helsinki.
Officer P. from the National Bureau of Investigation was in charge of the investigation. After the search P. gave interviews. His statements were widely spread in the media by the press and a TV channel. P. had also been assigned to be responsible for making any announcements to the media.
Lastly, the Court of Appeal reduced Mr Ahmet Sadik's prison sentence to fifteen months and commuted it to a fine of 1,000 drachmas (GRD) per day.
On 1 January 1996 sub-paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 217 § 1 were repealed and the whole provision was redrafted. From that date onwards the relevant sub-paragraphs read:
Schizophrenia is an illness or group of illnesses affecting language, planning, emotion, perceptions and movement. “Positive symptoms” often accompany acute psychotic episodes (including delusions, hallucinations, disordered or fragmented thinking and catatonic movements). “Negative symptoms”, associated with long-term illness, include feelings of emotional numbness, difficulty in communicating with others, lack of motivation and inability to care about or cope with everyday tasks.
In the course of these enforcement proceedings the Zhytomyr Regional Bailiffs’ Service requested the Bogunsky District Court of Zhytomyr to replace the Bogunsky District Bailiffs’ Service of Zhytomyr with the local department of the State Treasury of Ukraine, as the debtor under the judgment of 17 April 2003. On 28 October 2004 the court rejected this request. The applicant did not attend this hearing.
The toilet facilities, consisting of five cubicles, were shared by four units (nos. 2, 6, 7 and 9) which housed about 700 inmates in total.
Pursuant to Article 25 of the Basic Law, the general rules of international law form an integral part of federal law. They take precedence over statute law and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of German territory.
On 2 November 2005 the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment in full. With regard to the complaint about the length of the proceedings, the court, without giving any reasons, found that the tax proceedings could not be considered to have been of excessive duration.
On 7 May 2002 the Chişinău Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 March 2002, repeating the reasoning of the first-instance court in rejecting the claim for compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
On 5 and 26 June, 11 September and 16 October 1996 the County Court rejected further requests from the applicant to have the measure lifted, without specifying reasons. On 18 December 1996 the County Court rejected a similar request on the ground that the circumstances that had led to the taking of the measure had not changed.
Of the four hearings held between 19 November 1997 and 17 September 1999 none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.
The applicant, Ms Oksana Grygorivna Kamenivska, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1945 and lives in the city of Lviv. She was represented before the Court by Mr I. O. Nazaruk, a lawyer practicing in Lviv. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mrs V. Lutkovska and Mr Yu. Zaytsev, of the Ministry of Justice.
All the residents questioned refused to allow their relatives' bodies to be exhumed. They also stated that they and their relatives had nothing to do with the fighters.
In a writ served on the tenants on 16 January 1992, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenants to appear before the Rome Magistrate.
Since S.D. failed to perform her contractual obligations, on 21 March 1994 the applicants brought a civil action against her in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu).
In October 2006, December 2006, and June 2007 the command offered the applicant three flats in Tver. The applicant rejected these offers because he considered that the command should have first satisfied his claims for other benefits, and because he disliked the flats’ characteristics.
On the same day the District Court convicted Mr Brandstetter of adulterating wine (section 45(1) (a) of the Wine Act) and fined him 5,600 schillings. It also ordered the forfeiture of the wine contained in the two tanks seized - a total of 27,000 litres - (section 46(1)) and the publication of the judgment (section 45(3)).
“1. The clerk of the court hearing reports to the court about the presence of the parties and other participants of the proceedings and whether those who are absent have been duly notified, and also provides information about the reasons for their absence.”
That being so, the Indictment Division did not lay itself open to the objection raised in the ground of appeal by refusing to rule that the evidence from telephone tapping in connection with other proceedings was inadmissible;
The enforcement of the sentence shall be governed by the law of the administering State and that State alone shall be competent to take all appropriate decisions.
The applicant, Mr Rudolf Yakovych Myrskyy, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1932 and lives in Lviv. He is a Doctor of Philosophy and a political science professor, who also holds leading positions in the Holocaust International Centre, the Association of National Minorities in the Lviv Region, and the International Anti-Fascist Congress.
On 28 August 2006 the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s application for legal aid and the applicant appealed.
The applicants, Pierre and Marie-Louise Mieg de Boofzheim, are French nationals who were born in 1925 and live at Saint Martin de la Place. They were represented before the Court by Mr Prioux, of the Saumur Bar.
On 12 March 1997 the Dornbirn District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) ordered the applicant pursuant to section 103 § 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act (Kraftfahrzeuggesetz) to disclose within two weeks the full name and address of the person who had been driving her car at the material time on 17 January 1997.
The applicant is an ethnic Serb from Croatia, brought up in Vinkovci in the region of Eastern Slavonia which was at the time in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
At the time the events in the instant case occurred, the Conseil d’Etat held, following its settled case-law (extracts from its judgment of 29 October 1990 in the case of Diennet):
On 14 May 1987 the Salonika prefect modified the development plan (ρυμοτομικό σχέδιο) for the area in which the applicants' plots of land were located, which he designated as a “green area” and “sports and leisure zone”. This decision was confirmed by a decision of the Minister of the Environment and Public Works dated 31 July 1987 and by a presidential decree of 22 August 1988.
The applicant, Mr Eduard Fedorovich Kotsarenko, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1938 and lives in the village of Andreevka, Donetsk Region, Ukraine. The respondent Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev.
On 13 January 2006 the applicant’s lawyer repeated the habeas corpus request and the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention before the Chişinău Court of Appeal. The above complaints have never been examined by the Chişinău Court of Appeal.
The applicant did not appeal further as he considered or was advised that such a remedy would be bound to fail since no such social security benefit was payable to widowers under United Kingdom law.
At a trial hearing on 14 May 1998, the applicant repeated his request for bail, complaining about the lawfulness and conditions of his detention. The judge of the Kaunas City District Court noted that the medical experts had not yet submitted their conclusions as to the applicant’s state of health. The judge refused to vary the remand, as there was no guarantee that the applicant would not abscond.
On 27 January 2000 C.R. asked the Commissario to open the second termine reprobatorio, and he did so on 2 February 2000. On 24 February 2000 C.R. asked for the sum recorded in the bankbook (deposited by the applicant on 29 April 1993) to be checked and the accrued interest added; this was done by the registrar on 8 March 2000.
On 14 August 2000 the applicant appealed against the stay of proceedings claiming that the court could request the missing documents under its own powers. On 21 August 2000 he was informed by the same court that the stay of proceedings was not amenable to appeal.
By letter of 16 September 1981 the Director of Ila requested assistance from the Ministry of Justice to have the applicant placed in psychiatric health care. It appears that the Ministry concluded that no transfer to the psychiatric health system could be effected unless the situation developed and the applicant became psychotic within the meaning of the Mental Health Act.
Between 12 August and 5 December 1996 the proceedings were stayed because the applicant failed to pay an advance fee towards the costs of a supplementary expert opinion.
As the local public prosecutor failed to respond to the applicants’ complaint for almost seven months, the applicants’ representative wrote to the Minister of the Interior on 10 March 1999 informing him about the case.
“Evidence of the truth of such a statement or allegation is admissible where the statement or allegation was made in order to protect a legitimate interest. Where the truth of the statement or allegation is proved, no offence of insult or defamation will have been committed.”
the 1980 Act, if a Social Council considers that certain action is necessary, it has to apply to the County Administrative Court for a decision; unlike Child Welfare Boards under the 1960 Act, it cannot take the decision itself.
All official business with the receiving State entrusted to the mission by the sending State shall be conducted with or through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State or such other ministry as may be agreed.
The number of persons applying to these commissions had already attained approximately 170,000. A further 800 persons, whose applications were pending before the Court, had also applied to the compensation commissions. Many villagers had already been awarded compensation for the damage they had sustained.
A report dated 14 April 1993 by the Hozat police informed the Hozat public prosecutor that Ahmet Kaya's allegation had been investigated. The investigation disclosed that no Hozat police officer had made a statement alleging that Can and Kaya had been held at Tunceli Security Directorate.
Between 27 September 2002 and 20 February 2003 the applicant requested the court seven times to extend the time-limits for the submission of his comments on V.’s expert report.
On 28 October 1997 the Lębork District Court joined the applicant’s case with similar proceedings against seven other members of the cooperative.
Under Article 71 § 4, a person’s detention on remand shall not exceed three years. In cases of particularly serious offences, within the meaning of Article 41 § 2 of the Criminal Code, the maximum period of detention on remand is four years.
According to Article 187, a citizen or a legal person, who is not the owner of an immovable property but has bona fide, manifestly and continuously possessed it as his own property for a period of ten years, shall obtain ownership in respect of that property (adverse possession).
On 15 January 2009 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State) declared a further appeal (hoger beroep) by the applicant inadmissible, holding that he had failed to fulfil the requirements of Article 6 § 5 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht) by not including his name in the notice of appeal.
(ii) restrictions on or dissolution of political parties should be regarded as exceptional measures to be applied only in cases where the party concerned uses violence or threatens civil peace and the democratic constitutional order of the country;
If no restitution is provided for and the person entitled to restitution cannot be compensated by the assignment of other real property, he has a right to financial compensation according to specified conditions (section 16).
On 27 May 1993 the Nakkila Inheritance Tax Board fixed the inheritance tax to be imposed on Heidi, Jussi and Petri Jokela in respect of, inter alia, the four properties. Their market value was assessed at a total of FIM 600,000 (i.e. about FIM 20 per square metre). No reasons were given by the Tax Board.
All three couples, having children of school age, object to integrated, and hence compulsory, sex education as introduced into State primary schools in Denmark by Act No. 235 of 27 May 1970, amending the State Schools Act (Lov om ændring af lov om folkeskolen, hereinafter referred to as "the 1970 Act").
As his appeal against dismissal had a suspensive effect, Mr. Kosiek was able to continue teaching at Nürtingen Technical College, but the dismissal became final after the Federal Administrative Court’s judgment of 28 November 1980. He was accordingly notified on 15 December 1980 that his employment was at an end.
He gave an assurance that "Parliament will be informed of any changes that are made in the arrangements" (ibid., col. 208).
In the meantime, on an unspecified date, the applicant signed a preprinted form explaining the rights of arrested persons, including the right to remain silent and the right to legal assistance.
On 15 November 1999 the Zarichny Court allowed her claims and ordered the Department to pay the applicant UAH 1,181.71 in compensation. On 19 January and 28 January 2000, the Department paid the applicant UAH 199.39 in execution of the judgment.
“For the purposes of the unhindered conduct of the criminal proceedings... detention may be ordered against a person who is under reasonable suspicion of having committed a criminal offence if:
On 11 August 2001 the applicant association, a former Italian Military Internee (M) and the 271st applicant (Mr Ferrini), who had been subjected to forced labour as a civilian, lodged a constitutional complaint against sections 10 § 1, 11 § 3 and 16 §§ 1 and 2 of the Foundation Law with the Federal Constitutional Court.On the same page the newspaper also published an article by the journalist A. – “Do not step on journalists’ throats, do not knock the pen out of their hands!” (“Не наступайте на горло журналистам, не вышибайте из рук перо!”), in which the journalist quoted the applicant’s speech of 9 November 2004 and said the following:
On 14 September 2000 the investigator interviewed the applicant in her home, in the presence of her newly-retained counsel, and allowed the two of them to acquaint themselves with the case file.
On 4 July 2011 the applicant was released from detention and placed under house arrest. The Vásárosnamény District Court, having noted that he did not know any sign language and was able to communicate only with his mother, was of the view that the time spent by the applicant in detention had be to be reduced to a minimum.
On 20 November 2006 the Attorney-General acknowledged receipt of a request from the applicant for an interview and said that he would meet him during one of his forthcoming visits to the prison. According to the applicant, the meeting never took place.
The applicant was again hospitalised on 14 October 2006, and he underwent urgent haemodialysis. Afterwards the applicant left the hospital.
Section 36(1) of the 1993 Act provides that parties to proceedings before the Constitutional Court have to bear their costs and expenses. Subsection 2 of section 36 entitles the Constitutional Court, where justified and in accordance with the outcome of the proceedings, to order a party to fully or partially reimburse the costs and expenses of the other party.
On 13 October 2009, the advisory body to the prefect, the Prefectural College, met and discussed, inter alia, the issue of stray dogs on the streets of Bucharest. In a statement published on the website of the Bucharest Prefect’s Office following this meeting, the prefect stated that the problem of stray dogs was not yet solved and mentioned that:
From 2004 onwards his condition was classified as a disability of the second category (more serious), as the post-traumatic encephalopathy had worsened.
Upon re-trial, by a final decision of 21 September 2006 the Brasov Court of Appeal admitted the restitution proceedings of the former owners accepting that they had active standing and establishing that they were the owners of the flat.
On 8 December 2004 the Brzesko District Court dismissed in the light of DNA tests the applicant's action contesting his paternity of B. Subsequently, the applicant attempted to visit B; however, his wife apparently hindered his contact with his younger son.
I have been informed by the applicant that she cannot comply with that request, because she does not now hold a valid identity document from which her name as stated appears (omdat zij thans niet beschikt over een geldig identiteitsbewijs waaruit haar naam als opgegeven blijkt).
On 31 January 1998 D submitted its first report to the Government. Valuation schedules for key assets, projected returns from sales and financial statements were appended to the report. The executive summary of the report contained a paragraph in bold letters which stated (taken from the original version in English):
On 29 October 2001 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings because of the lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. In particular, he found that the applicant had attempted to flee and had resisted the policemen.
By a final interlocutory judgment of 8 December 2004 the TârguMureş Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor Office’s appeal against the interlocutory judgment of 12 May 2004 as moot on the ground that the applicant had already been released.
During the meeting on 16 July 2009, the daughter confessed that she had lied and that the allegations she had made the previous year had not been true. The son confirmed this. The daughter further submitted one letter to her parents and one to the District Court, in which she confessed to having lied and in which she expressed her wish to return to her family.
6. The pension was awarded to her from the date of application. In addition, she was paid the pension for the six months prior to the date of application, because Ukraine (her country of origin) was a party to the Agreement on securing the pension rights of citizens of the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States of 13 March 2003 (“the CIS Agreement of 2003”).
Pursuant to section 118 of the Act, an alien whose claim for international protection has been refused will nevertheless be granted leave to remain on humanitarian grounds, if his or her removal would breach the principle of non-refoulement. However, the alien concerned must be placed in detention if it has been established that he or she constitutes a threat to public order or national security.
On an unspecified date a preliminary investigation for robbery was opened against the applicant. He was questioned as a suspect on an unspecified date and a search of his apartment was conducted on 23 and 24 October 1991. On an unspecified date the preliminary investigation was suspended.
Lastly, on 11 November 2008, the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law by the Milan public prosecutor’s office against the Court of Appeal’s decision of 25 June 2008, on the ground that the public prosecutor did not have capacity to act in the proceedings. That decision rendered the contested judgment final.
The wording of section 80(1)(5) and (2) of the 1997 Ministry of Internal Affairs Act, which superseded the above provision in December 1997, was identical. The wording of section 74(1)(4) and (2) of the 2006 Ministry of Internal Affairs Act, currently in force, repeats verbatim that of section 80(1)(5) and (2) of the 1997 Act.
On appeal, on 16 June 2005 the Szeged Court of Appeal upheld this sentence at a public hearing. This judgment was served on 30 June 2005.
On 3 March 2002 the applicant was transferred to Valmieras prison and on 3 May 2002 he was released from prison after serving his sentence.
Mr Odabaşı was the chairman of the Kırşehir branch of HADEP. On 1 December 1997 the Ankara State Security Court convicted him of “incitement to hatred and hostility by making a distinction based on race and regional identity”, in breach of Article 312 of the Criminal Code in force at the material time.
In the meantime, on 17 August 2000, the State had granted the use of all the plots of land in question to a private transport company, B., from which it has been receiving rent to date.
In its comments on the above case, the National Tax Board (Riksskatteverket, formerly in charge of tax administration and enforcement service in Sweden), stated, inter alia, the following:In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence.”
On 25 October 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 29 November 2002, finding it to have been in accordance with the law and the procedural rules. It decided that it was not necessary to hold a hearing.
The relevant part of the Labour Act (Zakon o radu, Official Gazette 38/1995), as in force until 26 September 2001, read:
When the accused, while in custody, stayed in a medical institution, the period of stay there shall be included the period of serving the sentence.
On 14 February 2007 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) granted the claimant’s appeal and ordered the applicant company to pay 5,000 euros (EUR) in compensation to the claimant and to reimburse his procedural costs.
On 29 January 2011 the applicant was arrested by the police. He was under the influence of narcotic drugs and presented an identity card of his brother, who was an Estonian national. The applicant was taken into custody. On 28 February 2011 he was fined for a breach of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Precursors thereof Act (Narkootiliste ja psühhotroopsete ainete ning nende lähteainete seadus).
Broad prophylactic prohibitions that fail to ‘respond precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns’ the State cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny.” 838 F.3d at 73 (quoting Members of City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810, 104 S.Ct.
Based on the totality of the circumstances—the anonymous caller claiming to have eye-witness knowledge, the contemporaneous reporting of the activity, and the specificity of the description of the person holding the firearm, which the PRPD matched to Rivas-Castro—the call was reliable.
(explaining that ratification requires “knowledge of the alleged constitutional violation”); Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1342 (“[A] single decision by a municipal policymaker may be sufficient to trigger section 1983 liability under Monell ... [if there is] evidence of a conscious, affirmative choice.”); Neuroth v. Mendocino Cty., No.
27, 2010) (“Mitchell has, on three or more prior occasions, brought an action or appeal in which claims were dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and he has been informed of his three-strike status by numerous courts.”); Deen-Mitchell v. Young, No.
the charged state entity and the charged individual actors created the danger or increased plaintiffs vulnerability to the danger in some way; (2) plaintiff was a member of a limited and specially definable group; (3) defendants’ conduct put plaintiff at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm; (4) the risk was obvious or known; (5) defendants acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk; and (6) such conduct, when viewed in total, is conscious shocking.
See Stevens v. Steams, 2003 VT 74, ¶¶ 14—21, 175 Vt. 428, 833 A.2d 835; Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 627-631, 587 A.2d 975, 978-981 (1991).
21, 2016) (“It would frustrate the purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act if plaintiffs could avoid having their claims quickly compelled to arbitration simply by failing to mention the existence of clearly applicable arbitration agreements in their complaints.”) Cintas attached the Employment Agreement to its Motion, and Curtis does not contest its authenticity.
Counts II (conspiracy), IV (tortious interference with existing contract), V (tor-tious interference with prospective contract), VI (tortious interference with business relations), VII (tortious interference with business opportunities), VIII (fraud), IX (extortion), X (bribery), XI (civil conversion), XIII (defamation), XIV (business disparagement), XV (intentional infliction of emotional distress), and XVI (exemplary damages) of the amended complaint against the HISD defendants are dismissed.
Semyenova relies on cases arising in that context in her opposition to Bush’s motion to hold the case in abeyance, see Diet, 13 at 2-3 (citing Sipper, 869 F.Supp.2d at 116; Horn v. District of Columbia, 210 F.R.D, 13, 15 (D.D.C.
However, the DOC admits that it is unfamiliar with the billing practices of most Minnesota shops and reached this conclusion primarily based on representations from Reid, Rosar, Schmultz, and a few others affiliated with Minnesota’s auto-glass industry.
reh’g denied (Feb. 10, 2016) (“where a federal statute provides ■for either statutory damages or actual damages, plaintiffs who fail to allege actual damages nonetheless [may] satisfy both the injury in fact and redressability requirements of Article III standing by suing for statutory damages” (emphasis added)).
Given that the title of § 287.7(d) is “Temporary detention at Department request” and that § 287.7(a) generally defines a detainer as a “request,” it is hard to read the use of the word “shall” in the timing section to change the nature of the entire regulation.
18, 2014 (the ‘Record Date’) were entitled to receive an initial distribution from the Fund pursuant to the Plan of $0.155570 USD per unit of the Fund held on the Record Date.” (A44, ¶ 16; A571)
“[A]n act inherently dangerous to human life ... intentionally done so recklessly and wantonly as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief,” is sufficient to demonstrate “malice.” State v. Davis, 197 N.C.App.
Because the State of South Dakota filed suit on its own accord in state court in this case, at a time of its own choosing, with its hand-picked defendants, no such unfair prejudice is present, and FAG Bearings can appropriately be distinguished.
“The change in wording is meant to clarify that administrative law judges aren’t in the business of impeaching claimants’ character; obviously administrative law judges will continue to assess the credibility of pain assertions by applicants, especially as such assertions often cannot be either credited or rejected on the basis of medical evidence.” Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits courts to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The target of defendants’ request to strike 'is not a pleading, but rather the contents of plaintiffs responsive motion and declaration.
Accordingly, courts apply “strict scrutiny when the challenged classification jeopardizes the exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes individuals on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic such as race, alienage or national origin, see Banner v. United States, 428 F.3d 303, 307 (D.C.Cir.2005); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546, 119 S.Ct.
Plaintiff testified that on nearly a monthly basis between January 2009 and December 2009, she was treated at the clinic because she could not breathe, and for “body ache; heart beating fast; I feel like I’m dying; kept coughing and spitting.
38, 45-46 (6th Cir.2007) (“[T]he Plan’s overpayment provision asserts a right to recover from a specific fund distinct from [the employee’s] assets — the fund being the overpayments themselves — and a particular share of that fund to which the plan was entitled-all overpayments due to the receipt of Social Security benefit, but not to exceed the amount of benefits paid.”).
BP, as “Pipeline Owner” or “Operator” under the agreements, assigned its rights to Plains and TPC Pipeline Company (and its parent corporation, Tosco Corporation) as “Pipeline Lessee” and “Refinery Owner”, under the agreements, assigned its rights to Phillips.
Having considered the motions, responses, replies, supporting evidence, the argument of counsel, and the applicable law, the court will grant the summary-judgment motion and dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims and dismiss all other pending motions for the reasons to follow.
The Court must therefore grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss if it answers three questions in the affirmative: (1) whether the defendants are, “provider[s] ... of an interactive computer service,” 47 U.S.C.
Such a need is established if either: (1) failure to obtain expedited processing would pose an “imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual”; or (2) the requester is “primarily engaged in disseminating information” and shows an “urgency to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government ■ activity.” 5 U.S.C.
An intake questionnaire, which is a document with which a potential complainant provides information to the EEOC relevant to filing a formal charge of discrimination under the ADA, may itself constitute a charge when it contains the “information required by the regulations, i.e., an allegation and the name of the charged party,” and when it may “be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee,” such as when “the filer requests the agency to activate its machinery and remedial processes.” Fed.
v. Aniero Concrete Co., Inc., 404 F.3d 566, 603-04 (2d Cir.2005); Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir.1995)).
Although Morgan Stanley had not yet moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim, I ordered plaintiffs to show cause as to why their negligent misrepresentation claims against Morgan Stanley should not be dismissed in light-of my finding that Morgan Stanley made no actionable misstatement to plaintiffs.
In looking to decisions of other circuits as well as its decision in Short, the court held that “[t]he initial disclosure of a crime to one’s spouse, without more, is covered by the marital communications privilege.” Id.
The chapter 13 debtor, Gary D. Barbee (“Debtor”), instituted an adversary proceeding against U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for the Truman FHA Trust 2008-1, by and through its mortgage servicing agent BAC Home Loan Servicing (“Bank”) seeking to avoid the Bank’s interest in his manufactured home pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
It noted that ECMC—the defendant in both Walker cases as well—had improperly designated this as a subject matter jurisdiction issue, reasoning that because student loans are not discharged unless explicitly stated, a general order of discharge is not final as to such loans.
For ease of reference, these other creditors shall be referred to collectively as the “Lender Group.” As their agent, Mittman engaged in extensive litigation with the Judgment Creditors over the right to receive approximately $841,000.00 due to the Debtor from Vonage.
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”
So, too, a reasonable jury could find that this constitutional violation is attributable to ASORT through subsequent ratification, as indicated below with respect to the municipal defendants, see Wright, 138 F.Supp.2d at 957-58, or through the actions of Commander Combs and Team Leader Miller, who had unfettered discretion to determine the manner in which the knock-and-announce would be performed (see Doc.
A reciprocal insurance exchange, “in its pure form ... is a web of contractual relationships between subscribers who agree to insure one another, consummated through a common agent with power of attorney.” The overriding question is whether USAA is properly treated as a corporation or an unincorporated association for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Although Martinez testified he told the nurse about the beating he claims to have received during his medical screening the day after he arrived at the Federal Detention Center, based on her review of Martinez's Health Screen form and her independent recollection of Martinez, Pascale testified she is 100 percent sure both that Martinez did not tell her he had been injured and that she did not see any injuries.
Here, relying on its president’s affidavit, plaintiff alleges that “stock ownership [in Patriot Lines and Vessel Operations] was restricted to the Brophys and that the two companies existed as a ‘facade for the [Brophys’] operations.’ ” (Paper No.
893, or simply requires the implementation of an institutional policy, see UDC Chairs, 56 F.3d at 1474 (noting that if “the deprivation turns on a policy decision and not on an individual’s characteristics, a pre-deprivation hearing would do little to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation”).
In it, Aired alleges that Defendants engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory conduct resulting in the termination of her employment, and that Defendants thereby violated her rights under the following statutes: (1) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
Inc., 289 F.3d 530, 531 (8th Cir.2002) (“[E]nforeement of a settlement agreement by the court with jurisdiction over the underlying dispute [is] appropriate only where the agreement ‘had been made part of the order of dismissal____’”) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
For example, Mr. Marriner testified that during the time period of June 19 through December 31, 2007, the wind blew from Dragon’s kiln to the Darneys’ property only three percent of the time whereas it blew from Dragon’s kiln to Midas about ten to twelve percent of the time.
Surety shall have the exclusive right for itself and the Undersigned to determine in its sole and absolute discretion whether any claim or suit upon any Bond shall, on the basis of belief of liability, expediency or otherwise, be paid, compromised, defended or appealed.
Thus, because Jackson’s allegations do not set forth any facts implicating Chief Surber as personally involved in Jackson’s arrest, nor do they sufficiently plead a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983, I grant the Motion to Dismiss these claims as to Chief Surber.
CFIT’s [sic] has received financial support for this litigation from Internet domain name registrars and back order service providers, including but not limited to Pool.com, Inc. (“Pool.com”), Momentous, Inc. (“Momentous”), and R. Lee Chambers Company, LLC (hereinafter referred to collectively as “CFIT’s Supporters”)....
MVH appeals that decision, arguing that the criterion upon which the outcome turned, viz., the weight given to an applicant’s plan to broadcast to underserved populations, either violates the Communications Act of 1934, which requires the Commission to distribute licenses fairly, or is arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
He alleged three federal claims: (1) that the defendants, acting individually, jointly, and in conspiracy, deprived Beaman of a fair trial by withholding material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady (individual liability); (2) that the defendants conspired to deprive Beaman of material exculpatory evidence (conspiracy liability); and (3) that the defendants failed to intervene in preventing the violation of his rights (failure to intervene liability).
Once admitted into the Minnesota Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) system, Brooks received a chemical-dependency assessment, as all new inmates are required to have under Minnesota law, and was ordered to complete treatment in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and avoid disciplinary sanctions.
Despite a requirement that Defendant process the request for a final decision within sixty (60) days, and the further ability to force Plaintiff to file a civil suit within ninety (90) days from the issuance of a final decision, Defendant never filed a final decision until a month after Plaintiffs civil suit was commenced.
Underwriting purposes include, among other things, the decision whether or not to issue a policy, the amount and terms of coverage, and whether to renew or cancel a policy, but an insurer may not obtain a consumer report for the purposes of evaluating a claim.
First, he argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the 2006 interview clips, the letter to the inmate, and the facts he admitted in his plea agreement for the 2006 crime, because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs their probative value.
Although we hold that the NTSB acted arbitrarily and capriciously in declining to consider state law showing Petitioner had incurred fees for his legal representation— and based on that law, we hold that Petitioner did incur fees entitling him to fee-shifting — we emphasize several issues we do not decide and that we leave open on remand to the NTSB.
In order to obtain discovery regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction, at a minimum, the plaintiff must establish a colorable or prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants knew, or should have known, that the risk of new-onset diabetes mellitus or hyperglycemia associated with Risperdal is significantly higher than with older, cheaper, and equally effective “typical” antipsychotic drugs.
In addition, Palermo alleges that his manager, Brittany Williams (Williams), who is a black female, and another one of his direct supervisors, Terry Green (Green) were aware of his EEO Complaints, the 2004 Case, and the 2008 Case.
Arch took no action on eight of those claims (Chart, Claims 13-20), and issued a denial letter for the ninth claim (Chart, Claim 21) on March 1, 2010 by re-asserting its position noted before and further asserting that an intervening Endorsement No.
Because, apparently, no act of obeisance goes unpunished, the Federal Circuit then vacated this Court’s grant of summary judgment to Amphastar and held, in November, 2015, 'that the safe harbor provision did not apply to' its infringing activities.
This Court “may consider a number of factors, including whether the work performed was duplicative, if an attorney takes extra time due to inexperience, or if an attorney performs tasks normally performed by paralegals, clerical personnel, or other non-attorneys.” Ussery, 10 Vet.App.
Obviously, and to the extent further discussion of essential character is even necessary here: the essence of pots and pans is to contain and cook, and they can serve those functions with or without lids; and while lids may complete or enhance that purpose, they are merely incidental thereto and serve no purpose otherwise without the pots/pans to which they are intended to be fitted or combined.
Moreover, under section 5121, a determination of whether accrued benefits should be awarded “must be determined based on evidence that was either'physically or constructively in the [deceased claimant’s] file at the time of his death.” Ralston v. West, 13 Vet.App.
We will pay all sums an “insured” legally must pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies, caused by an “accident” and resulting from “garage operations” involving the ownership, maintenance or use of covered “autos”.
Where, as here, a prisoner “challenges the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct.
At oral argument, ST argued that it is clear that no renewal premium is due under ST’s premium plan because the document setting forth the premium plan, the 2005 Flow Plan, nowhere mentions renewal premiums being due after the MCL is reached.
Therefore, the government presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that defendant pledged “all furniture, equipment, and fixtures” in each of the four properties listed, including the Restaurant, and that he falsely represented that no one else held any interest in the collateral.
If the plaintiff succeeds in doing so, the burden of production shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct.
However, because the Court had previously overruled those additional arguments during the September 7 hearing, and because the Court specifically narrowed Defendant's supplemental argument to the issue of § 6308, and because Defendant’s reply raises new issues insofar as neither its supplemental filing nor Plaintiff's response raised those issues, the Court rejects those argument out of hand.
The closest Williams comes to addressing the Baze standard is in a heading in the briefs outline that reads, “What is known of the State’s Revised protocol indicates that Williams will likely suffer needless, undue, and excruciating pain during execution.”
This is undisputed, but neither party provides any evidence as to what kind of hospital Plaintiffs would be placed in, what level of care they would receive, what services they would be entitled to during their hospitalizations, or the probable durations of their hospital stays.
In sum, because Trader Joe’s has made no showing that the lack of an “All Natural” label would imply or suggest ascorbic acid inferiority in violation of the FDCA and FDA regulations, it has made no showing that plaintiffs’ Juice-related claims are preempted.
To be sure, to win on her alienation of affections claim, Plaintiff must prove: (1) love and affection of the spouse for the plaintiff; (2) actual damages; and (3) overt acts, conduct, or enticement on the part of the defendant causing those affections to depart.
Even after the execution of the Contract, Starr and Carson each signed various purchase orders that indicated delivery to Jas-min’s address; Trina delivered the solar panels directly to Jasmin in Australia; and Jasmin accepted and installed the panels, at one point stating in an email to Trina on which JRC was copied that Jasmin would pay the invoices.
In challenging the validity of Claims 1 and 9 of the ’681 Patent—both of which are independent claims—Nash cites Section 103 of the Patent Act, which forbids the issuance of a patent where “the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C.
In doing so, the Board should be mindful that it “has a special obligation to read pro se filings liberally.” Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355, 1358-59 (Fed.Cir.2009).
The failure to adhere to this procedural mandate renders the notice of pen-dency “defective and void from the beginning.”
The burden is on the moving party to show, through the pleadings, discovery and affidavits, “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fdet and [that] the movant is .entitled to-judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
The Court must therefore grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss if it answers three questions in the affirmative: (1) whether the defendants are, “provider[s] ... of an interactive computer service,” 47 U.S.C.
No unacceptable evals and nothing that really stands out in the weekly ... [training and HR pretty much agrees [sic] we don’t have a case: Perhaps Steve’s report will change in entirety based on 6th step info.
In this group are four pro se parties (Dwight E. Nolt [# 226], Mark Powell [#208], Chris Pavlou [#119] and Paul R. Worsham [# 200]) and one “professional and generally unsuccessful objector,” see In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec.
In Fluorine’s view, Amtrak may condemn a property interest only “as a last resort” — “where it cannot practicably do otherwise” — and it urges the Court to engage in a searching, fact- specific review of Amtrak’s condemnation decision.
There is no indication on the face of the April 1988 rating decision that the RO did not consider the evidence of record or the application of § 4.16(b), and the Court cannot conclude that it failed to do so on the basis of silence alone.
Should-the Court find that such costs constitute an economic injury sufficient to confer standing, “a private plaintiff bringing a UCL claim automatically would have standing merely by filing suit.” Cordon v. Wachovia Mortg., a Div.
To the extent that Vivendi’s argument is that GAMCO should have unearthed information that would have led it to discount Vivendi’s misrepresentations, such arguments fails because contributory negligence is not a defense to securities fraud.
The privilege “recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.” Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct.
The Veterans Court recognized its authority to grant relief by way of writ of mandamus, noting that such relief “is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances.” Veterans Opinion at 1 (citing Kerr v. U.S. Dist.
Plaintiffs respond by noting that, according to the Amended Complaint, the parties engaged in negotiations over an unexecuted draft Operating Agreement, which “contemplated that [the parties] would ‘jointly operate the proton therapy center.’” Pl.
The only exception to this general rule — one that is not applicable here — is if the transferor court already decided an issue (based on its own interpretation of the law) and thus the “law of the case” governs that issue even in the transferee court.
In other words, a finding that pinniped predation is having a significant negative impact on the decline or recovery of protected salmonids does not mean that pinniped predation is jeopardizing those salmonids, as the term is used in the ESA context.
In determining whether Capital-Source retained a security interest in the cash proceeds, the court acknowledged that under § 9-332, “CapitalSource did not have a security interest in the funds after Debtor [Delco Oil] transferred them to Marathon.”
The probation office filed a petition to revoke Defendant’s supervised release, alleging Defendant had been (1) associating with a convicted felon (a female) without permission, and (2) discharged from RRC for making threatening statements to a staff member.
Therefore, the court’s analysis in this Ruling focuses solely on the first step of the above inquiry: determining whether the state statutes “mandate or authorize a per se antitrust violation.” Freedom Holdings IV, 624 F.3d at 49 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Having considered the motions, responses, replies, supporting evidence, the argument of counsel, and the applicable law, the court will grant the summary-judgment motion and dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims and dismiss all other pending motions for the reasons to follow.
Now pending before the court is the “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of Defendants Gene Byron Schenberg, Richard F. Huck, III, Michael J. McKitrick, Danna McKitrick, P.C., NetSecure Technologies, Ltd. and Daniel McCann.” (Dkt.
Plaintiffs’ actions have (1) required defendant to file three additional motions, (2) unnecessarily prolonged this case, (3) required defendant to incur expenses it should not have incurred, and (4) wasted the time of both defendant and the Court.
During the interview, Defendant commented to Chief Koivunen that he had been using methamphetamine the previous week and made reference to “being up over a week.” Defendant also stated that he had been using methamphetamine on May 6 “all day.” (Gov’t Ex.
In the two years following Mr. Dodson’s death, Mrs. Carroll did not seek Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (“DIC”) benefits, which are available to the “surviving spouse” of a veteran whose death resulted from a service-related injury or disease.
While Wendy's found that a jury demand constituted a waiver of a contractual jury waiver, the opinion contains essentially no reasoning and does not explicitly address the question of whether the jury demand in that case was "proper” under Rule 38(d).
The chapter 13 debtor, Gary D. Barbee (“Debtor”), instituted an adversary proceeding against U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for the Truman FHA Trust 2008-1, by and through its mortgage servicing agent BAC Home Loan Servicing (“Bank”) seeking to avoid the Bank’s interest in his manufactured home pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
Although Morgan Stanley had not yet moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim, I ordered plaintiffs to show cause as to why their negligent misrepresentation claims against Morgan Stanley should not be dismissed in light-of my finding that Morgan Stanley made no actionable misstatement to plaintiffs.
The Audit Report also admitted only partial compliance with Standard 2100, regarding “a broader and more formalized approach in performing risk assessment procedures than is currently in practice at Chipotle,” and that IA believed Standard 2100’s “level of detail is not necessary or appropriate in the Chipotle environment.” (ECF No.
According to God-frey, Ralph Thumma, Loretta Seneca, Michael Froio, and Andy Keller, all employees at HOPE, would have testified that Godfrey had no involvement in the sales process and that all sales were handled by Burris and Fischer, and that Burris conducted all hiring and training of'employees; See Docket # 336, at 6-10.
This court has jurisdiction to review a decision of the CAVC “with respect to the validity of a decision of the Court on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation ... or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the [CAVC] in making the decision.” 38 U.S.C.
That one of the Board decisions the appellant was appealing was the June 2008 Board decision crystallized when he filed his pro se motion to recall mandate in February 2012, and later his informal brief, including arguments regarding the merits of the Substantive Appeal issue decided in the June 2008 Board decision.
In its papers in opposition to BDP’s motion for judgment, Deltech identifies the Stolt/BDP contract “whereby BDP contracted to perform freight-forwarding duties for Stolt” as the operative one, the breach as a failure to properly prepare the bill of lading, and asserts its position as a third-party beneficiary.
Unclean hands “is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief’ and originates from “the equitable maxim that ‘he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.’ ” Precision Instrument Mfg.
First, in the Civil Remedy Notice filed with the State of Florida, Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant “has already been provided with sufficient information in order to warrant a tender of policy limits” and advised that she was “willing to accept the policy limits to settle the claim...” [DE 1-2 at 16].
Plaintiff Laura J. Ramos alleged that her employer, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), discriminated against her on the basis of her race (Count I), subjected her to a hostile work environment (Count II), and retaliated against her after she filed an administrative complaint (Count III).
For the reasons stated above, the Court WITHDRAWS its May 31, 2013, decision, DENIES Mrs. Tagupa’s motion for leave to submit supplemental evidence, SETS ASIDE the Board’s August 2, 2011, decision, and REMANDS the matter for VA to seek verification of service from the Department of the Army.
It is clear, therefore, that upon receipt of a letter disputing the factual accuracy of information in a consumer’s file, Section 1681i imposes a duty on a CRA both to reinvestigate and to either delete the disputed information or disclose the current status of the disputed information to the person disputing the information.
However, plaintiff chose not to pursue a “denial-of-benefits claim” under § 1132(a)(1)(B), presumably because of “the broad discretion that [defendant] enjoys in construing the terms of the Certificate, which in turn would necessitate a showing that its decision to deny [plaintiffj’s claim was arbitrary and capricious.”
Where, as here, a prisoner “challeng[es] the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct.
It is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to, among other things, “interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by the employee of any right under” the chapter of the CSRA related to union and labor rights, or “to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter.” 5 U.S.C.
The Court notes, however, that the clause authorizing the payment of attorney’s fees in Estate of Gaines is much broader than the clause contained in this case, which limits payment to “charges incurred in the administration of the Trust.” Restated Revocable Living Trust dated May 1, 2006, DN 27-6, p. 13.
Conversely, when the preponderance of the evidence weighs against the claim, “[the Board] necessarily has determined that the evidence is not ‘nearly equal’ or ‘too close to call,’ and the benefit of the doubt rule therefore has no application.” Ortiz v. Principi 274 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2001).
Broad prophylactic prohibitions that fail to ‘respond precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns’ the State cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny.” 838 F.3d at 73 (quoting Members of City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810, 104 S.Ct.
The emphasized clause is referred to as the “residual clause,” and in Johnson 2015 the Supreme Court held that the residual clause “denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges,” and, therefore, violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
Sony attached the images with its message “User’s current photo downloads included the following: .... ” Without use of a filter like a hash value system, no one at Sony could have known about Susan_14’s photos unless someone actually had “use[d] human eyes” to review them.
The court saw “no way for the government to obtain a meaningful share in an entireties property without forfeiting some part of the innocent spouse’s interest, as long as the spouses remain married to each other and do nothing to terminate the entireties estate.”
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of NBI, holding that White was estopped from re-litigating whether he committed fraud against NBI, and on November 9, 2011, entered judgment in favor of NBI and against White in the amount of $378,486.17.
However, the DOC admits that it is unfamiliar with the billing practices of most Minnesota shops and reached this conclusion primarily based on representations from Reid, Rosar, Schmultz, and a few others affiliated with Minnesota’s auto-glass industry.
Accordingly, to be entitled to equitable tolling, Ms. Cheeo must have exercised due diligence between July 6, 2011 — the date of the Board decision — and October 6, 2011 — the date on which the Board decision was resent to her at her new address.
Over the course of almost one year, [the Plaintiff] did receive[] $108,500.00, possibly from the $424,233.00 which is unaccounted for; however, it is unclear whether the $108,500.00 came from one of the Trust Enterprise accounts, Defendant Birch’s IOLTA account, or an unknown account.”
The District Court found that the plaintiffs’ overtime claim was factually inadequate, on the ground that, “[t]he abundance of allegations notwithstanding,” the plaintiffs “failed to allege a single specific instance in which a named Plaintiff worked overtime and was not compensated for this time.” App.
Haddad alleges that Midland Funding “is engaged in the business of a collection agency, using the mails and telephone to collect consumer debts originally owed to others,” is licensed as á collection agency by the State of Illinois, and’“regularly collects or attempts to collect defaulted consumer debts.” Doc.
Accordingly, intertextually, these examples of the legislature’s multiple other uses of the disputed phrase and ones similar to it in other versions of the statute and the very enactment applicable here, convince us that it uses the phrase to mean the interpretation urged by Defendants, rather than by Plaintiff.
The court cannot conclude, without additional facts, whether Benedetto’s arrest was either “a basic assumption on which the contract was made” or “foreseeable.” Thus, Delta may not use the doctrine of impossibility to defeat Benedetto’s breach of contract claim at this stage of the litigation with the facts as pleaded.
Therefore, the references in the minutes to “retention” and “maintaining the status quo” relied on by plaintiffs need not be definitively construed by the Committee as indicating an intent to provide the enhanced benefits to employees whose entities were sold but who continued working for the purchasing employer.
Defendant notes that the Department of Justice publieally has taken the position for almost 20 years that the highest willfulness standard applies to campaign-finance violations, as indicated in both its manual published soon after Cheek and Ratzlaf but before Bryan and by its manual published almost 10 years after Bryan.
Even though he asks for rescission of the note and mortgage in his Complaint, Plaintiff argues that “[determining whether Blake properly rescinded the promissory note does not require the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the property to grant judgment, nor does it result in the Court awarding possession of the property to any party.” (Pl.’s Memo.
The contracting officer endeavors to select the approach that will provide the best overall value to the Government, understanding that the “relative importance of cost .of price may vary.” Id, For example, when “the requirement is clearly definable and the risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, cost or price may play a dominant role in source selection.”
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”
He alleged three federal claims: (1) that the defendants, acting individually, jointly, and in conspiracy, deprived Beaman of a fair trial by withholding material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady (individual liability); (2) that the defendants conspired to deprive Beaman of material exculpatory evidence (conspiracy liability); and (3) that the defendants failed to intervene in preventing the violation of his rights (failure to intervene liability).
Plaintiffs further allege that notwithstanding the termination of their license agreements, Daewoo and its owner, Ro, continued to rent and even sell infringing and pirated copies of plaintiffs’ works, which were obtained via Internet downloads and unauthorized personal copying, and/or from defendant Korean Korner, Inc. (“Korean Korner”) and defendant Sun Yop Yoo (“Yoo”), the former owner of a now-defunct video store by the name of Ann Bang Video.
Darren L. DeFlanders (“DeFlanders”) appeals from the decisions of the United States Court of' Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming the decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“the Board”): (i) finding that De-Flanders had not submitted new and material evidence sufficient to reopen claims for service-connected disability compensation for a left knee disability and spots on the lungs; (ii) denying compensation for spots on the brain; and (iii) denying a disability rating in excess of 10% for non-cardiac chest pain.
Succinctly stated, the Secretary’s contention that § 4.85(a) requires the effective date for an increased disability claim to be set in accordance with the date a Maryland CNC test is administered not only adds words to the regulation that are not there, but it also conflicts with the plain meaning of section 5110(b)(3), which requires the effective date of an award of increased compensation to be “the earliest date as of which it is ascertainable that an increase in disability had occurred.” 38 U.S.C.
Given the holding in Koloms, the question remaining for the Court, then, is whether the underlying suits are like the furnace leak in Koloms, namely, the type of isolated, run-of-the-mill result from day-to-day operations and properly covered, or whether they arise from “traditional environmental pollution.” Though it may be more art than science to determine when the isolated consequences of normal business operations end and “traditional environmental pollution” begins, the instant case falls cleanly within the definition.
Works Co. are: (1) the defendant's good faith effort to comply with the statute: (2) the defendant's degree of culpability; (3) the defendant’s histoiy of previous violations; (4) the nature of the public interest in ensuring compliance with the regulations involved; (5) the nature and circumstances of the violation at issue; (6) the gravity of the violation; (7) the defendant’s ability to pay; (8) the appropriateness of the size of the penalty to the defendant’s business and the effect of a penalty on the defendant’s ability to continue doing business; (9) that the penalty not otherwise be shocking to the conscious of the court; (10) the economic benefit gained by the defendant through the violation; (11) the degree of harm to the public; (12) the value of vindicating the agency authority; (13) whether the party sought to be protected by the statute had been adequately compensated for the harm; and (14) such other matters as justice may require.
In his claim for negligence, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant NDI’s potentially negligent conduct includes: (1) failing to ensure a proper chain of custody of the subject specimen; (2) failing to communicate with Plaintiff and the testing facilities any and all factors which could or did affect the testing; (3) failing to take into account and eliminate any and all factors which may improperly influence the tests; (4) failing to prevent testing results of and/or reporting of a “false-positive”; (5) failing to pre-test interview Plaintiff to rule out abnormalities which could and/or did influence the tests; (5) failing to maintain and/or cause to be maintained appropriate quality-control testing and/or reporting mechanisms and/or protocols; (6) failing to comply with governing procedures, regulations, protocols, and/or laws concerning reporting and/or testing; and (7) failing to monitor and/or control others’ compliance.
For instance, the Two Left Feet treatment supplements the real amateur competitors with a few “goofballs” for “comic relief of course,” and “a few ringers to make the other guys envious and competitive.” Likewise, the treatment describes one host as an “ex law enforcement officer, federal agent, with a masters degree in Social Work,” who would use this background to “manipulate” the other host, a “biochemist with a cool analytical nature, yet a vicious temper,” and who would focus on analyzing competitors using various scientific parameters, such as “bodyfat” and other statistics.
Judge Gordon Graham signed an order appointing Defendants McQueen and Tonigan as special state’s attorneys to investigate and prosecute individuals for using their official position in the SAO to give benefits in criminal prosecutions to friends, relatives, and supporters.
At the time, the state-sponsored terrorism exception did not provide an independent cause of action, but instead acted “as a ‘pass-through’ to substantive causes of action against private individuals that ... may exist in federal, state or international law.”
The claim is based on conduct that occurred before 2004, so in order for the Kansas Securities Act to apply, the case must have been instituted within that statute’s limitations period, or by July 1, 2010, five years after the effective date of the Uniform Act.
To unravel the plot against him, Mr. Blaney requested that the Veterans Court convene' a special investigating committee, enter summary judgment on his claims, and issue an order that would enable Mr. Blaney to sue the Veterans Court and the VA.
The District Court held a suppression hearing and heard testimony from one witness for the Government — Officer Hough — and five witnesses for the defense — Ismail, Delaine, Siddiqah, Tazke-yah, and Richard Thomas, III, a friend of Mallory’s.
Although it is generally the case that “when an expert relies on the opinion of another, such reliance goes to the weight, not to the admissibility of the expert’s opinion,” Ferrara & DiMercurio v. St. Paul Mercury Ins.
“Under Twombly’s construction of Rule 8 [a plaintiffs] complaint [must] ‘nudge[ ] [any] claims’ ... ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’ Ibid.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S.Ct.
To do this, “a plaintiff may show that the employer’s explanation is “unworthy of - credence ... because it has no basis in fact.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1047 (8th Cir.
He testified that he did not understand courtroom procedures, or phrases such as “constitutional right,” “consult with attorney,” “inference,” or “degree” — all terms that were used by the trial judge in colloquies with Newman.
The legal sufficiency of each.claim asserted against the defendant, a foreign embassy, which is presumptively immune from suit under the' doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity,'see Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA"), 28 U.S.C.
One statement was that alcohol dependence can “develop[] to a point where it is irreversible without professional help” and “[a]t such time, the person by himself, may lack the capacity to avoid the continued use of alcohol.” Amicus App.
Similarly, in American Power & Light, the Court upheld a delegation to the SEC to take such actions as necessary to prevent companies from “unfairly or inequitably distributing] voting power among security holders.” 329 U.S. at 104-05, 67 S.Ct.
The Board did not err in finding that “[t]he elapsed time between VA’s receipt of notice in January 2009 and its response in September 2009 does not change the fact the [v]eteran had knowledge, nor does it mitigate his responsibility.” R. at 9.
The Goldmans contend that HALO has no viable fraud claim because it “undeniabl[y]” had “full knowledge of the loss of the Track Group.” Under Missouri law, a plaintiff must justifiably rely on a false statement to assert a claim of fraud.
Plaintiff testified that on nearly a monthly basis between January 2009 and December 2009, she was treated at the clinic because she could not breathe, and for “body ache; heart beating fast; I feel like I’m dying; kept coughing and spitting.
Whether a claim is subject to the Tucker Act depends on whether, “in whole or in part, it explicitly or ‘in essence’ seeks more than $10,000 in monetary relief from the federal government.” Kidwell v. Dep’t of Army, Bd.
In their briefing, the parties refer to this Notice of Lapse as the May 23 Notice, but the Court will refer to it as the May 24 Notice because the Policy’s 61-day grace period began on the 24th when the notice was sent.
By letter dated June 5, 2007, Holzrichter responded to a question posed by a representative of WisDOT: “Isn’t joining the Union your choice?” He answered stating that he could not join a union because of economic, moral and ethical considerations.
As a result of this holding, we need not address whether section 5121 of title 38 could be inapplicable to FVECF claims for the additional reason that section 5121 may be preempted by ARRA section 1002(c), which governs the scope of FVECF survivor claims.
Mr. Lewis has alleged improprieties, related to tuition and fees, and he has alleged'that Full Sail charged him for courses that he did not take, but he has not provided any specifics concerning misrepresentations made by Full Sail or any other defendant.
Although Wesolowski complains that he first requested dental treatment on October 1, 2001, and that he was not examined by a dentist until April 11, 2002, he fails to allege any factual basis whereby that delay can be attributed to one or more of the defendants.
Dr. Wood was also unable to devise a permanent accommodation that would have allowed Crider to fulfill her responsibilities with respect to site visits, conferences and other weekend events without at least some work or travel on Friday nights and Saturdays.
The invention attempts to: (1) prevent bubble fluid or (2) air from flowing back through the tube; (3) hold sufficient bubble fluid so as not to limit the quality of the bubbles; and (4) prevent bubble fluid from dripping down the outside of the tube onto the user.
As a result, the RO assigned Mr. Delisle a 100 percent disability rating for the period from April 7, 2010 to May 31, 2011, and assigned a 60 percent rating, along with a total disability rating based on individual employability for the period following May 31, 2011.
For ease of reference, these other creditors shall be referred to collectively as the “Lender Group.” As their agent, Mittman engaged in extensive litigation with the Judgment Creditors over the right to receive approximately $841,000.00 due to the Debtor from Vonage.
Although the Board noted that DC 5280 was potentially applicable in light of Mr. Copeland’s diagnosis of hallux valgus, it determined that his hallux valgus was only “slight to moderate without surgical resection,” and so a separate disability rating was not warranted.
The cases Regions offers in support of its argument do not examine this alleged requirement in any detail, but merely make a passing reference to being “charged for the call.” See Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 859 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1329 (S.D.Fla.2012); Knutson v.
If not, analysis proceeds to step four, and the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the ability to perform physical or metal work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments.
Similarly, given the existence of similar designs in the market and Huitink’s use of established engineering standards, the fact that Huitink admits that he created his proposed alternative design solely for the purposes of this litigation (Huitink Dep.
After reviewing the relevant Ohio and federal statutes, he found that “abuse” is defined as “the willful infliction of injury, unreasonable confinement, intimidation or punishment with resulting physical harm, pain or mental anguish.”
In the exhibit, Plaintiffs provide factual allegations that MacIntyre was not paid for a total .of 76 hours of overtime between 2012 and 2014, and Sullivan was not paid overtime-for a total of 48 hours in 2013 and 2014.
The Government argues that Mr. Haddad does not have standing to sue for the ’844 patent, because Mr. Haddad transferred all substantial rights in the ’844 patent to sole exclusive licensee Astornet, Gov’t Mot.
The First Circuit has held that “retaliation claims are preserved so long as the retaliation is reasonably related to and grows out of the discrimination complained of to the agency.” Clockedile v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 245 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2001).
In order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct.
Generally, more weight is give[n] to the opinions of treating sources, even “controlling weight,” if they are well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence (20 CFR 416.927(d)2).
Trooper Rivera, working under the name “Jose,” then told Haskell that he could compensate for the botched drug deal by burning down a house in Springfield and an abandoned property in Holyoke, Massachusetts, as part of a fictional insurance scam “Jose” was purportedly arranging.
If an exceptional disability picture is found, the RO or Board must determine whether related factors exist such “as marked interference with employment or frequent periods of hospitalization as to render impractical the application of the regular schedular standards.” 38 C.F.R.
Back in open court, the judge put on the record what he had ruled (he would • allow evidence that Lawson failed to report income but not evidence that Lawson failed to file tax returns), but not why he reached these conclusions or how he thought a jury could make proper use of the tax evidence.
As I explained at summary judgment, to determine whether a defendant has met its burden of proving the routine maintenance exemption, courts examine the projects, taking into account the 1) nature and extent, 2) purpose, 3) frequency, and 4) cost of the activity to arrive at a common-sense finding.
To prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment created a hostile work environment; and that (5) the employer is vicariously liable.
While several circuits have held that merely placing child pornography in a shared folder on a file sharing network warrants application of a distribution enhancement, no circuit has relied on the Sentencing Guidelines definition of “distribution” to interpret the meaning of the term in § 2252(a)(2).
Therefore, “if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal — if it is arbitrary or purposeless a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.”
Lastly, he alleges that on August 20, 2014, he learned the “forms never reach[ed] [the New] Orleans[] [RO]” and “the counselor [] was upset that [he] continue® to call asking about these form[s] and want[ed] to know who [] [he] had been talking to,” and refused to filed a notice of appeal.
A jury is not required to accept an expert’s opinion, and defendants’ experts present different opinions, but a jury could reasonably find, on the basis of plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions, that it is more likely than not that one of defendants’ PIFs was contaminated and caused E.B.’s illness,
Approximately one week later, the FTC and Defendant filed a Consent Judgment and Order in which Defendant agreed to, among other things, not assess or collect “any Fee for a Default-Related Service unless it is a reasonable Fee charged ... for a Default-Related Service that is actually performed.” (Doc.
The date of admission to a non-VA hospital where a veteran was maintained at VA expense will be accepted as the date of receipt of a claim, if VA maintenance was previously authorized; but if VA maintenance was authorized subsequent to admission, the date VA received notice of admission will be accepted.
Ms. Haynes later submitted a request to the Regional Office to reopen her claim on the presentation of new documentation showing a decision by the Army Board of Correction of Military Records (“ABCMR”) to award Ms. Haynes an annuity as a “former spouse” under the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act (“USFSPA”).
Five months after Mayor Graf was elected, he published a “From Your Mayor” opinion piece in the Farmingdale Observer, which stated, in part: “We have defined an area of the Village for possible redevelopment and have ... put this plan on the ‘front burner.’ Much of the property [near] Secatogue Avenue ... is within the ‘blighted’ area.” (Ex.
The district court had federal question jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law gross negligence claim, and "a federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is bound to apply the law of the forum state to the same extent as if it were exercising its diversity jurisdiction.” Bass v. First Pac.
Those guidelines, the 2005 Flow Plan explicitly provides, are set forth in “SunTrust Mortgage guidelines that are currently being used and have been mutually agreed upon.” The partial integration doctrine obtains in situations where, wholly unlike this one, the written instrument is silent on a material issue and consequently fails to impart a “complete legal obligation.” Cf.
On appeal to this Court, the appellant argued that she satisfied the criteria for non-service-connected burial benefits because (1) the phrase “in receipt of compensation” in section 2302(a)(1) should be interpreted to include those veterans who were entitled to receive compensation at death, and (2) Mr. Wingard was entitled to receive compensation at the time of his death because 38 U.S.C.
In order to establish a prima facie case for discrimination under § 1981, the plaintiff must show that (1) it is a member of a protected class; (2) it sought to enter into a contractual relationship with the defendant; (3) it met the defendant’s ordinary requirements to enter into a contract with it; (4) it was denied the opportunity to enter into a contract with the defendant that was otherwise afforded to companies owned by whites.
Courts may issue a writ of mandamus only if three conditions are satisfied: 1) the petitioner must demonstrate that he lacks adequate alternative means to attain the desired relief, thus ensuring that the writ is not used as a substitute for the appeals process, 2) the petitioner must demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to the writ, and 3) the court must be convinced, given the circumstances, that the issuance of a writ is warranted.
In determining when an action is commenced by the Secretary of Labor under this subsection for the purposes of the statutes of limitations provided in section 255(a) of this title, it shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any individual claimant on the date when the complaint is filed if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint, or if his name did not so appear, on the subsequent date on which his name is added as a party plaintiff in such action.
While a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “that are so related to claims in the action within [the Court’s] original jurisdiction that they form a part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” a court may decline to exercise such jurisdiction where it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Indeed, unless “consideration of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants” weigh in favor of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims.” Because Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a viable federal claim, and because this case is at the beginning stages of litigation, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims at this time.
While there is no evidence in the Thurman opinion that the plaintiff expressly challengfed the application of the limitations provision on the basis of the change in corporate entity, this Court finds the Sixth Circuit’s application of the Chrysler Corporation provision instructive; in the absence of evidence or legal authority to the contrary, the agreement with Pinnacle precludes a finding of a legitimate expectation of just cause employment.
In this matter, Dr. Pence offers four opinions: (1) BSC did not conduct adequate testing of the Pinnacle product prior to placing them on the market; (2) the Pinnacle product was inadequately labeled; (3) patients could not adequately consent to the surgical implantation of the Pinnacle due to the misbranding of these products; and (4) BSC failed to meet the post-market vigilance standard of care for their products, leading to further mis-branding.
However, even if the Plaintiff does so and makes out a prima facie retaliation claim because “there is evidence that the adverse employment action was motivated in part by protected speech, the government can avoid liability if it can show that it would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of the protected speech.” Heil v. Santoro, 147 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.1998).
Moreover, any such inference is belied by Commerce’s reference to its final determination in Galvanized Steel and Wire From the People's Republic of China, which describes Commerce's offsetting practice for the AD cash deposit rate as premised only on the concept that domestic subsi dies had a symmetrical effect upon export and domestic prices.
Ms. Swanson also argues that the Veterans Court failed to decide an issue correctly, but she does not support this allegation with anything more than the phrase “controversies to which the United States shall be a part” followed by citations to two Supreme Court cases addressing the scope of the judicial power under Article III.
However, other Ninth Circuit cases shed some light on exactly when detention becomes “prolonged.” First, in Nadarajah v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit reviewed Supreme Court cases and found that the Court had “used the six-month period as the touchstone of reasonableness.” 443 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir.2006).
Based on the totality of the circumstances—the anonymous caller claiming to have eye-witness knowledge, the contemporaneous reporting of the activity, and the specificity of the description of the person holding the firearm, which the PRPD matched to Rivas-Castro—the call was reliable.
Citadel further alleges that it has been damaged by “breach of the parties’ agreement because it has lost the benefit of the bargain it would have otherwise enjoyed if it had been able to complete the project and lease it to [WRMC], as called for in the parties’ agreement.”
Plaintiffs also admit that “the Complaint and the exhibits ... allege a pattern of racketeering extending to just under one year,” but they argue- that “the ‘two year’ requirement in order to establish closed-ended continuity is not a bright-line rule.” (Pis.’ Opp’n Br.
In her summary judgment briefs, Otico presented a surprise argument (a surprise to Hawaiian and to the Court, anyway) that Hawaiian failed to pay her for ten minutes of time she worked on each of eight separate days after she’d completed the training program.
Although the title refers to wartime, section 1157 extends the compensation rates in sub-chapter II "to those veterans who served during a period of war and during any other time, who have suffered a disability in the line of duty in each period of service.”
Tutin also wrote that Santangelo struggled to adapt even though he was expected to recognize problems and react more quickly moving forward and that Tu-tin expected Santangelo to transform Alsip into a more robust and flexible group capable of addressing industry challenges.
Without an admission from GEICO, medical testimony from an expert or her treating physician, or circumstances of the type that lay jurors could extrapolate from the evidence a causal connection between accident and injury, Blair is unable to make that showing as a matter of law.
The Board also found that the medical evidence of record, especially the 2011 examiner’s report, showed that other post-service injuries and normal wear and tear of age and his employment as a truck driver, not any basic training injury, most likely caused Vann’s lower back pain.
Finally, contrary to Defendant Hernandez’s assertions, the Report concluded that, based upon the “supporting documentation, it appears that [EPFCU] sustained a loss of at least $19 million resulting from the actions of their former employee ... Hernandez.” Report 4 (emphasis added).
The Second Amended Complaint makes clear that the relator is alleging that Boston Heart’s claims were “legally false” because, according to the relator, Boston Heart certified that the tests it performed were medically necessary even though they were not medically necessary for certain populations.
Relying on these cases and a textual analysis of the provisions at issue, Husic argues that § 212(h) has been made unavailable only to an alien who was admitted as an LPR, rather than one who, like Husic, adjusted to LPR status once already in the United States after lawful entry as a visitor.
Similarly, the fact that the regulation authorizes a single extra-schedular evaluation— “an extra-schedular evaluation” — arising from the “disability or disabilities” indicates that referral for extra-schedular evaluation may be based on the collective impact of the veteran’s disabilities.
Considering the policy and purpose behind Rule 13(a), the court permitted the claim to go forward because it found no sign of the “circuity of action that Rule 13(a) was aimed at preventing,” since the plaintiffs bringing of multiple actions was required by statute.
Second, appointing an interim director does not require the appointing authority to provide the same benefits; indeed, if it did, then the on-leave employee could contend that the position was filled on a permanent basis while she was on FMLA leave.
Once the movant properly configures a summary-judgment motion, the burden shifts onto the nonmovant—or “the party who bears the burden of proof at trial,” Geshke v. Crocs, Inc., 740 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir.
Furthermore, the plaintiff concedes in her Opposition that the Act was enacted “to keep D.C. residents out of harm’s way,” and therefore creates a “general public duty.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.
In addition, the Secretary states that “it is clear [that DC] 5284 is not applicable in this case,” as the plain language of that DC “foreclose[s] rating a foot condition ... that was not the result of an in-service injury.”
Plaintiff concedes that her wrongful discharge claim “does not fit within the limitations of the WLAD, FMLA or WFLA because she did not meet the required number of hours worked in the year prior to the accrual of her claim.” ECF No.
Because the State of South Dakota filed suit on its own accord in state court in this case, at a time of its own choosing, with its hand-picked defendants, no such unfair prejudice is present, and FAG Bearings can appropriately be distinguished.
The Government has called at trial two so-called “cooperating witnesses,” ie, alleged co-conspirators of the defendants who have pleaded guilty and who are “cooperating” with the Government by testifying at trial in hopes of receiving a sentence reduction.
A farmout agreement is "[a] very common form of agreement between operators, whereby a lease owner not desirous of drilling at the time agrees to assign the lease, or some portion of it (in common or in severalty) to another operator who is desirous of drilling the tract."
To the extent Mr. Washington argues that the Veterans Court should have decided the gunshot wound claim in his favor without requiring a remand, he raises factual .issues of sufficiency of the evidence concerning his duty status at the time he was shot, and issues of his credibility.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Geriatric Release does pot provide juveniles with the opportunity to obtain release “based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” as required by Graham, because the Parole Board has the authority to deny release “for any reason whatsoever.”
Before this court, Mr. Smith characterizes the Plan as a settlement agreement and argues that the Veterans Court failed to “enforce” the settlement agreement; Mr. Smith requests that we remand his case to the Veterans Court with instructions that it “enforce” the settlement agreement approved by this court in NOVA.
In this case, where the plaintiff has not produced time-sheets and the defendant has failed to respond, the Court will accept Martinez’s declaration, submitted under the penalty of perjury, as to the hours she worked and wages she received, except to the extent that her declaration seeks relief beyond that sought in the complaint.
In all, the development of the Plan entailed a process of shifting and re-shifting portions of the County from one district to another, reviewing the resdlt, and trying again.” The Commissioners deferred greatly to Brace in developing the remedial plans, and further deferred to Brace and their attorneys regarding the plans’ legality.
The quagmire of alternative definitions for assault on a female is further highlighted in the more recent cases arising out of the North Carolina appellate courts, which seem to recognize proof of either force or violence, particularly in cases where a battery based on force alone, even if only slight, provides the basis for the “assault” element of the crime.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that chapter 980 did not require dismissal of Gilbert’s commitment petition because the chapter does not contain language allowing for dismissal in his circumstances, does not set a time period for execution of a commitment order, and provides that an individual may be simultaneously committed under chapter 980 and incarcerated at a DOC facility.
Plaintiff Fraternal Order of Police Penn-Jersey Lodge 30 (“FOP”) brought this action against Defendant Delaware River Port Authority (“DRPA”) to move the Court for a mandatory injunction ordering the DRPA to submit to binding interest arbitration over the terms and conditions of employment for the patrol officers, corporals, and sergeants whom FOP represents and whom DRPA employs.
Third, because applications for second or successive petitions based on Johnson arguably must be filed before June 26, 2016 (we do not decide that question now), if the Supreme Court concludes in Welch that Johnson is retroactive, failing to hold the applications in abeyance could deprive petitioners of the benefit of Johnson’s ret-roactivity and render a determination of retroactivity meaningless, as a practical matter.
Finally, this Court has considered Peters’s reliance on United States v. Quinones, wherein the court, faced with a similar motion, granted the defendant’s request for a stay of forfeiture, reasoning that “[i]f the government were to sell the four parcels in such a [slumped] market, they [sic] would, in effect, be foregoing any potential for appreciation in value once the market recovers; this loss will ultimately be borne by [the defendant] if the forfeiture order is reversed on appeal.” No.
On appeal, Niehaus reinterprets the accepted facts of this case and attempts to paint USB as an “ ‘eyes wide open’ participant in the fraud.” She bases her allegation that USB conspired with her on the assertions that (1) USB knew of her unlawful conduct by early 2010 when it confronted her about her fraud and asked her to resign; (2) one of USB’s owners refused her resignation and thereby allowed her to continue to embezzle funds; (3) USB advised her to withdraw D.C. and J.C.’s funds and transfer the money to another bank; arid (4) in the civil suit, USB agreed to release Nie-haus from any and all claims relating to the litigation.
Witness, for example, his continued emphasis on the facts that Mr. Mitchell could have appealed the September 2003 decision, challenged its determination that new and material evidence had not been submitted, and raised the fact that VA never respond ed to the December 1973 audiogram, but failed to do so, post at 445, even though the Federal Circuit explicitly rejected almost identical objections in Beraud, see 766 F.3d at 1406 n. 1.
The court’s central purpose in granting leave to implead a third party is “to promote judicial efficiency by eliminating the necessity for the defendant to bring a separate action against a third individual who may be secondarily or derivatively liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs original claim.” Sw. Adm’rs, Inc. v. Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir.1986).
A reciprocal insurance exchange, “in its pure form ... is a web of contractual relationships between subscribers who agree to insure one another, consummated through a common agent with power of attorney.” The overriding question is whether USAA is properly treated as a corporation or an unincorporated association for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C.
See e.g., Potts, 882 F.2d at 1324 (“A statute modifying the content of state tort law doctrines of contributory and comparative negligence seems to us to be a classic example of the type of substantive rule of law binding upon a federal court in a diversity case.”); Winningham v. Swift Trans.
“If the conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, or if it was objectively reasonable for the [official] to believe that his conduct did not violate such a right, then the [official] is protected by qualified immunity.”
Here, relying on its president’s affidavit, plaintiff alleges that “stock ownership [in Patriot Lines and Vessel Operations] was restricted to the Brophys and that the two companies existed as a ‘facade for the [Brophys’] operations.’ ” (Paper No.
But the bottom line is the more protection, if you will, we can provide for the families of those who are going through what has to be just the most horrific time in their life, I think we have an obligation to do it.
Instead, “[vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct.
Such standards are critical because even in cases where a regulation is content- neutral on its face, “placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency ... may result in censorship.” Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758, 108 S.Ct.
The Agreement further states that the “arbitrators must make their decision within 60 days following the termination of the hearing” and that “[t]he majority decision of any two arbitrators” of the three-arbitrator panel “will be final and binding” on the parties.
Here, Giwa has presented no evidence at all to counter Landes’ affidavit that sets forth her understanding of the facts on which she based her conclusion that Giwa was under-performing as a Senior Urban Planner or that he made mistakes that deserved a lower rating.
Underwriting purposes include, among other things, the decision whether or not to issue a policy, the amount and terms of coverage, and whether to renew or cancel a policy, but an insurer may not obtain a consumer report for the purposes of evaluating a claim.
That record also stated that on that date the “[c]ourt found defendant guilty as charged in the information and ordered a Judgment of Conviction to be entered on the record.... Court ordered defendant REMANDED into the custody of the Milwaukee County Sheriffs Department.”
The issue here is whether an insured can round up general settlements from its subcontractors, unilaterally decide that they will be allocated to uncovered damages, and then go after the insurers that would cover the damages if the loss was properly allocated to that policy, .
The Supreme Court briefly addressed the issue within the scope of the Fair Housing Act, summarizing that if a tester has “suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against,” then regardless of the motivation behind bringing the suit, an injury has occurred.
For past performance, the solicitation informed offerors that “[t]he Government will conduct a performance confidence assessment based upon the past performance of major or critical aspects of the requirement as it relates to the probability of successfully performing the solicitation requirements.”
When a federal court sits in diversity, it “has personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if (1) an applicable state long-arm statute confers jurisdiction and (2) the assertion of that jurisdiction is consistent with constitutional due process.” Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1199 (4th Cir.1993).
A decision is considered “final and ... appealable where it 1) resolves and seriously affects substantive rights and 2) finally determines the discrete issue to which it is addressed.” Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Schulman v. California (In re Lazar), 237 F.3d 967, 985 (9th Cir.2001)).
Once admitted into the Minnesota Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) system, Brooks received a chemical-dependency assessment, as all new inmates are required to have under Minnesota law, and was ordered to complete treatment in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and avoid disciplinary sanctions.
Such a need is established if either: (1) failure to obtain expedited processing would pose an “imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual”; or (2) the requester is “primarily engaged in disseminating information” and shows an “urgency to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government ■ activity.” 5 U.S.C.
In a decision of 19 June 1995, the Director of Revenue granted relief from the capital-gains-tax surcharge, interest for late payment and related penalties for the year 1991 in the amount of FRF 250,401 on the principal sum due and FRF 130,208 on the interest and penalties.
“To the best of our knowledge there have been no successful claims for loss or damage to movable property allegedly resulting from National Guard or Cyprus Government action, 'legal proof' being difficult to produce.”
“... Judicial decisions are adopted by the courts in the name of Ukraine and are mandatory for execution throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.”
On 27 May 2005 the liquidator wrote to the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for the company's nationalised property under the Presidential Decree. On 14 June 2005 the Minister of Finance replied, inter alia, in the following terms:
On 12 August 2004 the local department of the State Securities and Stock Market Commission imposed a fine on the applicant company for failure to comply with the legislation on market circulation of shares.
(2) A general immunity, possessed by all persons and bodies, from being compelled on pain of punishment to answer questions the answers to which may incriminate them.
The accused shall attend the hearing. However, the accused may appear by counsel in the case of minor offences which do not attract a custodial sentence or where the hearing concerns an objection, a matter unconnected with the merits of the case or the civil interests.
On 10 March 1992 the applicant, as he arrived from Rio de Janeiro, was arrested at Lisbon Airport; he was carrying a false passport and a suitcase containing 1.5 kg of cocaine.
On 10 August 1999 the prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor’s office quashed this decision on the ground that the investigator had not taken all procedural measures that could be accomplished in the applicant’s absence.
On 12 April 2001 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the applicant against the decision of 5 March 2001 under the extraordinary review procedure.
On 1 March 1990 Edificaciones March Gallego S.A. appeared before the same court and declared their intention of applying to have the proceedings against the company set aside. The document giving notice of that intention, which was submitted by the company’s lawyer (procurador), Mrs I., stated “… on 26 February last the summons and copies of the application for proceedings for payment were handed to my client…”.
On 24 January 2004 the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) ordered in camera that the applicant be detained and that the deadline for bringing the charges was 17 June 2004. This decision was not subject to appeal.
“A child of a single adopter is not entitled to special child benefits unless the single adopter dies, see subsection 2, one or more of the conditions of subsection 3(iii) to (v) are satisfied, or the child has been adopted as a stepchild and one or more of the conditions of subsection 3(ii) to (vi) are satisfied.”
The applicant submits that he was not informed about the majority of the scheduled court sessions at which his detention on remand was prolonged, therefore he could not attend them.
There was no intention to humiliate or to debase the applicant and the prison authorities did not undertake any action in order to humiliate him.
On 15 May 1996 a Customs and Excise appointed drug financial investigation officer advised the applicant’s solicitors that he was carrying out an investigation into their client’s financial affairs and that he wished to interview him in order to assist the court in determining whether he had benefited from drug trafficking. The applicant declined to take part in the interview.
On 13 October 1999 the applicant was informed that the enforcement of the judgment was stayed pending the supervisory review proceedings.
On 22 July 1997 the İzmir State Security Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced Yahya Keser to fifteen years, Nedim Öndeş to fourteen years and seventeen months, Arap Doğan to two years and eleven months and Ferhan Özçelik and Selhan Tekin to three years and nine months’ imprisonment.
The Court of Appeal’s judgment contained no assessment as to the reliability of the statement of the anonymous witness or as to the validity of the witness’s desire to remain anonymous.
On 27 December 1995 the Court of Cassation quashed the applicant’s conviction on the ground that he should have been convicted of the offence under Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code. It referred the case to the Ankara Assize Court (ağır ceza mahkemesi). The criminal proceedings are still pending before the latter court.
On 4 February 2002 the applicant complied with the instructions set out in the decision of 1 February 2001 and resubmitted his complaint about the Prefect’s decision of 9 June 1999 to the Preobrazhenskiy District Court.
A licence must be revoked if it has been misused in such a way that the holder can no longer be deemed suitable to provide the service, though in less serious cases a warning may be issued; it must also be revoked if the service is not maintained (Chapter 3, sections 1 and 2, of the 1979 Act).
On 15 November 2000 E. was examined at the clinic by Dr H. That session was also videotaped. No meeting with the applicant was arranged in respect of the results of that examination.
It appears that a copy of this judgment was sent to and received by the first applicant on 31 June and 4 July 2003 respectively. It further appears that the second applicant received a copy of this judgment in person at the Court of Appeal on 15 August 2003.
Subsequently, he lodged an action with the Munich Labour Court to have his dismissal annulled. He argued that a “moral dilemma” had prevented him from carrying out the requested examination.
It appears that the applicant was invited to participate in two preparatory meetings held by the Social Welfare Board on 15 March and 2 April 2002. The applicant did not attend.
The draft law thus allows the States to consent in advance to the intervention of other Parties on a ship flying their flag or located within their territorial waters.
On the morning of 19 February 1993, the applicant was taken to Derik district gendarmerie headquarters. He was released on the same day.
The applicant, Ms Izabella Paar, has the citizenship of Hungary and Australia. She was born in 1929 and lives in Perth, Australia. Her previous application (no. 22762/93) was declared inadmissible by a Committee on 7 April 1994.
According to the order of the General Directorate of National Roads and Highways, the amount due was paid to the applicant on 22 December 1998. The applicant claimed that he was paid on 4 January 1999. He received a total of TRL 368,837,000.
A description of the relevant domestic law can be found in the Court’s decision of Aydın İçyer v. Turkey (no. 18888/02, §§ 44-54, 12 January 2006) and in its judgments of Doğan and Others v. Turkey (nos. 88038811/02, 8813/02 and 8815-8819/02, §§ 31-35, ECHR 2004-VI) and İpek v. Turkey (no. 25760/94, §§ 96-103, ECHR 2004II (extracts)).
On 21 June 1999 the applicant federation lodged an ordinary appeal against that decision with the Central Electoral Council, which dismissed the appeal in a decision of 23 June 1999.
The applicant is a company based in Milan. It is represented before the Court by Vito De Honestis, a lawyer practising in Milan.
At the material time section 54 of the Law of 17 June 1966 on Enforcement Proceedings in Administration (“the 1966 Act”) provided that a creditor had a right to lodge a complaint about excessive length of enforcement proceedings with an authority superior to that carrying them out.
The applicant finally complained of an impairment of the principle of equality of arms, as its appeal on points of law had been declared inadmissible by the Supreme Court, while the appeal based on the same ground submitted by the defendant had been granted.
On 11 April 1994 the Tarnów Regional Prosecutor supplemented the charges against the applicant with further multiple charges of obtaining credit under false pretences, forgery of financial documents and issuing of bad cheques.
On 5 January 1983, 26 October 1982, 1 March 1981 and 9 November 1982 respectively the applicants were arrested on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation.
According to the Government, a medical examination of Mr Lecha Khazhmuradov’s body carried out on an unspecified date reported that he had died due to an extensive open wound to the head with calvarias bone fracture and complete ejection of his brain matter.
On 29 July 1994 the Sosnowiec District Court ordered that two psychiatric reports be obtained in order to establish the applicant’s criminal responsibility.
The applicant, Mr Markward von Loesch, is a German national who was born in 1938 and lives in Berlin. He is represented before the Court by Mr T. Gertner, a lawyer practising in Bad Ems.
Established in 1947, ad hoc parliamentary committees investigated the circumstances of acts of violence committed after the liberation in 1945, as a result of which a number of criminal proceedings had commenced and continued until February 1948, when the democratic constitution of Czechoslovakia was undermined again.
In his appeal to the Board for Accident Compensation (tapaturmalautakunta, olycksfallsnämnden) on 15 June 1993 the applicant required that the decision of the insurance company be overturned and that his rash be compensated as an occupational illness.
On 19 September 2002 the Wroclaw Regional Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention. In a very brief reasoning the court stated that there was a reasonable suspicion against the applicant and that, given the likely heavy sentence and the fact that the applicant had acted in a criminal group, only his detention could secure the proper course of the proceedings.
Everyone has the right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information by oral, written or other means of his or her choice.
On 10 July 1995 the applicant was laid off by the company “Daka-lift” d.o.o Skopje (“the employer”) where he worked as a lift repairman.
On 28 February 2006 the applicant went to the United Kingdom. The Government stated that the applicant left following their request of 24 February 2006. However, the applicant submitted that he had not received the Government’s letter and that he had left Cyprus to visit his sister who permanently resided in the United Kingdom.
The relevant domestic law is summarised in the judgment of Romashov v. Ukraine (no. 67534/01, §§ 16-19, 27 July 2004).
Such an obligation follows from section 71 of the Social Services Act 1980 (Socialtjänstlagen, 1980:620), subsections 2 and 4 of which read as follows:
The applicants are all Turkish nationals. They were living in Halitpınar village at the time of the alleged events giving rise to the present application. The facts of the case are in dispute between the parties and may be summarised as follows.
The Regional Court held that the general situation in Libya was not as such that asylum seekers from Libya automatically qualified for asylum. It should therefore be established whether, on the basis of his personal situation, the applicant had founded reasons to fear persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
The District Court judge shall set a date for the hearing after such preliminary inquiries as may be necessary have been made (Article 451 (4)).
On 4 November 2003 the applicant was informed about the date and venue of the hearing of his case by the Presidium.
During the second pregnancy of the applicant’s partner, the relationship began to suffer. In order to alleviate the situation, the applicant moved out in November 1992, but remained in close contact with both his partner and his son. The pregnancy ended in a miscarriage.
On 30 January 1980 the Internal Revenue Service forwarded a complaint to the police in which it stated that the activities of the applicant and SCE seemed to involve violations of the Danish tax laws and the Penal Code.
Mr Altun says that he was subjected to various forms of ill-treatment: he was suspended by his arms (which were tied together), beaten, sprayed with cold water and deprived of sleep. He further complains that he was blindfolded and his testicles were wrung.
“At the request of the applicant authority, the requested authority shall, in accordance with legal or regulatory provisions applicable to the latter, take all necessary measures in order:
On 16 April 1996 the Municipal Court, after having assessed a substantial amount of documentary evidence and having heard the parties to the dispute, upheld the Land Office’s decision. The court, refusing to grant the applicant leave to appeal, said in particular:
From May 1996 until October 1999, given that he had been reinstated by the Constanţa Bar, he paid monthly Bar fees and UAR fees amounting to 1,983,000 Romanian lei (approximately 225 euros [“EUR”], according to the average exchange rate for the relevant period).
Subsequently, the applicant withdrew the power of attorney granted to his lawyer and the Szczecin Regional Bar (Okręgowa Rada Adwokacka) appointed another counsel for him.
The applicant, Mr David Sanders, is a British national who was born in 1948 and lives in Cambridge. He was represented before the Court by Royds Rdw, solicitors in London. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr C. Whomersley of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
On 17 November 1994, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 16 December 1994.
On 24-25 June 2003, the Court of Appeal held a hearing on the above grounds. The applicant appeared in person. In its judgment of 25 June 2003, the court rejected the grounds concerning the jury bundle and unused banking documents. As concerned the defects in the summing, it held:
On 19 January 2001 the applicant brought a civil claim against the employer, requesting the court to annul the reassignment decision. She claimed that the new post had not been stipulated in the employer's Rules on Posts (“the Rules”) and it did not correspond to her qualifications and work experience.
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine decides on issues of conformity of laws and other legal acts with the Constitution of Ukraine, and provides the official interpretation of the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of Ukraine.”
On 14 February 2003 the Žilina Regional Court discontinued the proceedings against the Vranov nad Topľou District Court judge as there was no indication that she had committed an offence. According to the Government, the proceedings against the other accused are pending.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the claimant’s further appeal, holding that where the Convention was invoked on the sole ground of the treatment to which an alien was likely to be subjected by the receiving State and that treatment was not sufficiently serious to engage Article 3, the court was not required to recognise that any other Article of the Convention was, or might be, engaged.
On 11 November 1986 Mr Schmidt applied finally to the Federal Constitutional Court, which on 31 January 1987, sitting as a panel of three members, declined to accept the appeal for adjudication, on the ground that it did not have sufficient prospects of success. It noted, inter alia:
Upon appeals by the applicant, those decisions were annulled by the higher prosecutors or the courts on the ground that the investigators' Ms L. A. P. before her death.
The applicant appealed. Referring to the Court's judgment in Gradinger v. Austria (23 October 1995, Series A no. 328C) he asserted that the two sets of proceedings were based on the same conduct. He further argued that his defence, which had been accepted in the court proceedings, was that he had not even noticed the accident. He explicitly waived his right to a hearing.
Between 12 December 2002 and 1 February 2005 the District Court took several decisions ascertaining who the defendants in the action were and correcting clerical errors in those decisions. The applicant challenged these decisions by way of appeals (odvolanie) and appeals on points of law (dovolanie). The latter were declared inadmissible on 25 August and 21 October 2005 as, in the circumstances, no such remedy was available.
In its judgment of 8 February 1996, following adversarial proceedings, the Regional Court convicted the applicant of being involved in narcotics offences and of membership of a criminal organisation. He was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. The applicant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of The Hague.
It is therefore unnecessary to examine further the other conditions required for enforcement, namely conformity to international public policy and circumvention of the law.”
They shall enjoy in full the same civil and political rights as the subjects of Greek origin. Muslims shall be entitled to freedom and to practise their religion openly.
On 7 November 1986 the Conseil d’État, accepting the submissions of the Government Commissioner (commissaire du gouvernement), declared the application inadmissible for the following reasons:
The applicant is a British national, born in 1960 and living in Banffshire, Scotland. She is represented before the Court by Mr C.S. Fyfe
The applicant, Mr Henrik Munkholm Wulff, is a Danish national who was born in 1981 and lives in Perth, Australia. He was represented before the Court by Mr Tyge Trier, a lawyer practising in Copenhagen. The Danish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Thomas Winkler, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and their Co-Agent, Mrs Nina Holst-Christensen, of the Ministry of Justice.
According to an official extract from the National Criminal Record (rikosrekisteri, straffregistret), the applicant has been found guilty of the crimes mentioned below.
On 24 April 2004 two separate referendums were held simultaneously in Cyprus on the Foundation Agreement–Settlement Plan (“Annan Plan”) which had been finalised on 31 March 2004. Since the plan was approved in the Turkish-Cypriot referendum but not in the Greek-Cypriot referendum, the Foundation Agreement did not enter into force.
Under Article 37 § 2 of the Charter everyone is entitled to legal assistance in proceedings before the judicial authorities, other State authorities or the administrative authorities. Article 32 § 1 provides that all parties to judicial proceedings must have the same rights.
On 15 August 2000 the hearing was adjourned because the parties had not attended. On 24 August 2000 the Basmanniy District Court refused to examine the action because the parties had again failed to appear.
According to Article 22 of the Code on Enforcement of Sentences (2003), prosecutors supervise the enforcement of sentences with a view to ensuring compliance with the existing legislation.
On 1 January 1994 a new Real Property Transactions Act (dated 1993) came into force. According to the 1983 Act, the authority of second and final instance had been the Regional Real Property Transactions Authority (Landesgrundverkehrsbehörde). In the 1993 Act the Regional Real Property Transactions Authority was replaced by the Regional Real Property Transactions Commission (Landes-Grundverkehrskommission).
On 21 January 1998, the applicant appealed against the decision, arguing that inter alia as a child he had been incapable of consenting to the sexual acts in question, and that non-consensual indecent assault and buggery could not be other than a crime of violence.
On 9 April 1995 the applicant gave a statement to the police, where he confessed that he had been involved in certain activities for the PKK.
On 26 March 2005 the prosecutor's office of unit no. 20116 forwarded the SRJI's complaint about Marvan Idalov's kidnapping to the prosecutor's office of unit no. 20102.
On 10 November 1994 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State before the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking damages. He based his claim on section 180 of the Civil Obligations Act.
(e) Ayios Amvrosios, registration no. 13131, plot nos. 400 and 401/1, sheet/plan XIII/27.E.1, inaccessible field with nine olive trees, area: 1,254 sq. m.
In February 1994 the Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Innsbruck Regional Court lodged the first bill of indictment. In June 1994 the second bill of indictment was lodged. The Innsbruck Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s objections (Einspuch) against these indictments.
Section 145a of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if a decision is served on the accused, the defence counsel must be informed thereof at the same time and must be provided with a copy of this decision, even if there is no written power of attorney in the case file.
On 19 February 1982 he applied to the Calabria Regional Administrative Court (“the RAC”) for judicial review of two reductions in salary, for the months of February and May 1981, imposed on him by the schools’ inspectorate and reimbursement of the sums unpaid, after adjustment for inflation and the addition of interest at the statutory rate.
The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde), which was rejected by a group of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court on 28 February 1994.
On 11 November 1997 BNB revoked DCB AD's licence by reason of insolvency. It found that a check up of its assets and liabilities as of 30 September 1997 indicated that the liabilities exceeded its assets by BGL 6,161,379,000. The decision stated that it was not subject to judicial review.
In a decision of 22 May 1996, the Revenue granted relief from the surcharges that had initially been imposed for bad faith in respect of the remaining contested tax assessments (on income from land for the years 1990 and 1991) in the sum of FRF 4,459 for 1990 and FRF 16,661 for 1991.
These issues are considered on the appeals of: the President of Ukraine; at least forty-five National Deputies of Ukraine; the Supreme Court of Ukraine; the Authorised Human Rights Representative of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea;
The Supreme Court, on 1 April 2008, rejected the co-accuseds’ plea of nullity and referred the case to the Court of Appeal to decide on their and the Public Prosecutor’s appeal.
The Supreme Court quashed the Municipal Court’s judgment in respect of the above fourth of the property and, at the same time, quashed the relevant part of the District Court’s judgment of 18 September 1998.
On 14 November 1975 the applicant wrote to the Housing Department asking for reconsideration of the order of 10 September 1975. He reiterated the argument concerning access to the field. The Department acknowledged receipt of this letter but did not reply to it. On an unspecified date in 1976, an amended requisition order, including the field adjacent to the applicant's tenement, was issued.
The relevant part of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court (Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 49/2002 of 3 May 2002 – “the Constitutional Court Act”) reads as follows:
On an unspecified date in 1998 the applicant initiated another action for a declaratory judgment under section 11 § 2 of the ALA. He petitioned to the courts to recognise that, as an heir of his father, he had the right to have the property rights restored in respect of one more property, a plot of 6,000 square metres.
1. On 16 February 2001 the applicant sent a reminder of his request of 24 January 2001 to the NTV administration, explaining that the video recording submitted by the Government to the Court did not contain the relevant news broadcasts.