From 3d2a7b090e2cb8f2af1912e5b67f16ad0895fd50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Leitschuh Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2022 13:24:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] vuln-fix: Partial Path Traversal Vulnerability This fixes a partial path traversal vulnerability. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`. To demonstrate this vulnerability, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`. The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory. It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object. For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`; however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`. Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Severity: Medium CVSSS: 6.1 Detection: CodeQL & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.PartialPathTraversalVulnerability) Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh Bug-tracker: https://github.com/JLLeitschuh/security-research/issues/13 Co-authored-by: Moderne --- .../java/com/github/jlangch/venice/impl/util/io/LoadPaths.java | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/main/java/com/github/jlangch/venice/impl/util/io/LoadPaths.java b/src/main/java/com/github/jlangch/venice/impl/util/io/LoadPaths.java index f6887163c..57c8a27f4 100644 --- a/src/main/java/com/github/jlangch/venice/impl/util/io/LoadPaths.java +++ b/src/main/java/com/github/jlangch/venice/impl/util/io/LoadPaths.java @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ private boolean isFileWithinDirectory( if (dir_.isDirectory()) { final File fl = new File(dir_, file.getPath()); if (fl.isFile()) { - if (fl.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(dir_.getCanonicalPath())) { + if (fl.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(dir_.getCanonicalFile().toPath())) { // Prevent accessing files outside the load-path. // E.g.: ../../coffee return true;