unconfined.te

#######################################################
#
# This is the unconfined template. This template is the base policy
# which is used by daemons and other privileged components of
# Android.
#
# Historically, this template was called "unconfined" because it
# allowed the domain to do anything it wanted. Over time,
# this has changed, and will continue to change in the future.
# The rules in this file will be removed when no remaining
# unconfined domains require it, or when the rules contradict
# Android security best practices. Domains which need rules not
# provided by the unconfined template should add them directly to
# the relevant policy.
#
# The use of this template is discouraged.
######################################################

allow unconfineddomain self:capability ~{ sys_ptrace sys_rawio mknod sys_module audit_write audit_control linux_immutable };
allow unconfineddomain self:capability2 ~{ mac_override mac_admin };
allow unconfineddomain kernel:security ~{ load_policy setenforce setcheckreqprot setbool setsecparam };
allow unconfineddomain kernel:system ~{ syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
allow unconfineddomain domain:fd *;
allow unconfineddomain domain:dir r_dir_perms;
allow unconfineddomain domain:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow unconfineddomain domain:{ fifo_file file } rw_file_perms;
allow unconfineddomain domain:{
    socket
    netlink_socket
    key_socket
    unix_stream_socket
    unix_dgram_socket
    netlink_route_socket
    netlink_firewall_socket
    netlink_tcpdiag_socket
    netlink_nflog_socket
    netlink_xfrm_socket
    netlink_selinux_socket
    netlink_audit_socket
    netlink_ip6fw_socket
    netlink_dnrt_socket
    netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
    tun_socket
} *;
allow unconfineddomain domain:ipc_class_set *;
allow unconfineddomain domain:key *;
allow unconfineddomain {fs_type -contextmount_type -sdcard_type}:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } ~relabelto;
allow unconfineddomain dev_type:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } ~relabelto;
allow unconfineddomain {
    file_type
    -keystore_data_file
    -property_data_file
    -system_file
    -exec_type
    -security_file
    -shell_data_file
    -app_data_file
}:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } ~relabelto;
allow unconfineddomain exec_type:dir r_dir_perms;
allow unconfineddomain exec_type:file { r_file_perms execute };
allow unconfineddomain exec_type:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow unconfineddomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow unconfineddomain system_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
allow unconfineddomain system_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow unconfineddomain {
    fs_type
    -usermodehelper
    -proc_security
    -contextmount_type
    -rootfs
    -sdcard_type
}:{ chr_file file } ~{entrypoint execute_no_trans execmod execute relabelto};
allow unconfineddomain {dev_type -kmem_device}:{ chr_file file } ~{entrypoint execute_no_trans execmod execute relabelto};
allow unconfineddomain {
    file_type
    -keystore_data_file
    -property_data_file
    -system_file
    -exec_type
    -security_file
    -shell_data_file
    -app_data_file
}:{ chr_file file } ~{entrypoint execute_no_trans execmod execute relabelto};
allow unconfineddomain rootfs:file execute;
allow unconfineddomain contextmount_type:dir r_dir_perms;
allow unconfineddomain contextmount_type:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
allow unconfineddomain node_type:node *;
allow unconfineddomain netif_type:netif *;
allow unconfineddomain domain:peer recv;
allow unconfineddomain { domain -init }:binder { call transfer set_context_mgr };